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Berisha: Serbia Still Supporting 'Aggression'

AU0905120294 Tirana DITA INFORMACION in Albanian 28 Apr 94 p 3

[Interview with President Sali Berisha by unidentified Radio Deutsche Welle correspondent on 23 April; place not given: "Is Greece a Compass for Serbian Policy?"]

[Text] [Correspondent] What is your attitude toward the proposal by the Serbian President Milosevic in Romania about the creation of a confederation of Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania, Albania, and so on?

[Berisha] The Serbian president would have done much better, I think, if he had given peace and stability to the Bosnian people and had given orders to the Karadzic-type criminals to stop bombarding Gorazde and obey the will of the EC and the norms regulating peace and good relations among countries. That would have been a valuable contribution by him to the solution of the conflict that was started by Belgrade and is still being ferociously backed by it. There can be no way of establishing any federation or confederation as long as Serbian aggression is creating thousands of victims. It is a mere farce, a phoney proposal reflecting Serbia's integrationist plans tantamount to the Greater Serbia idea, aggression, and conflict in the Balkans.

[Correspondent] Neither Montenegro, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], or Kosova were mentioned at all in Milosevic's draft constitutions. What does this augur for the Albanian territories?

[Berisha] It shows that President Milosevic, in accordance with the Memorandum of the (Serbian) Academy of Sciences [on the formation of a Greater Serbia], is going out of his way to draw all these territories into a Greater Serbia. There is no doubt that he has come up with this proposal just to be able to make Serbia the dominant factor and ensure its hegemony over the Balkans. However, I must stress here that the idea of a Greater Serbia and its domination over the Balkans can never bring stability to the region and, historically speaking, it is an erroneous and totally groundless idea. The Balkans can never be given stability by those who set it on fire. It would be absurd to claim that the Balkans could be dominated by a population that accounts for no more than 10 percent of the entire population of the region. I am of the opinion that Serbia must once and for all renounce its policy of aggression and war, and naturally after this there must be a policy of cooperation throughout the Balkan peninsula.

[Correspondent] What would you say about President Clinton's proposal, and what would be your comment on NATO's steps and military intervention against Serbia?

[Berisha] I have stressed in the past, and I would like to stress again, that the restoration of NATO's credibility is of tremendous importance to the solution of this conflict that has swept over the region and to the prevention of other conflicts in the Balkans. I have welcomed all President Clinton's proposals and I hope that the Atlantic union and NATO will put them into practice. It is impermissible that a gang of bandits and criminals with 30 or 50 tanks should humiliate universal principles and the international community, thus causing the greatest human slaughter that Europe has witnessed since World War II.

[Correspondent] What is your opinion on Milosevic's proposal for dialogue...

[Berisha] Albania has already expressed its view on this matter: It is and always will be in favor of dialogue and negotiations. The only way to resolve problems is to recognize realities and evaluate them, not ignore them. I am certain that a dialogue of this kind between Milosevic and Rugova, under the auspices of a third party, would lead to the solution of the Kosova issue.

[Correspondent] What are the prospects for Albania's relations with Greece in the wake of the border incident?

[Berisha] It is rather difficult to define the prospects for our relations with Greece, because unfortunately Greece through its actions has turned into a compass, as it were, for the aggressive Serbian policy in the Balkans. So, while there is war going on in the north and a policy in the south that favours aggression and creates tensions in the Balkans, our relations with Greece remain tense. However, I would like to express Albania's determination to overcome, through dialogue with Greece, the great problems created in the Peshkopia area. There are many plans under way proportionately to expand the number of our two countries' diplomats, and these plans will be discussed as early as 3 May, when our two foreign ministers will meet in Geneva. We intend to make our contribution to the success of this meeting and the reduction of tensions in the southern Balkans, but the truth is that Greece is deeply affected by chauvinism.

Article Sees Kosovo Policy in 'Blind Alley'

AU0605130294 Tirane KOMBI in Albanian 26 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by Arjan Sokoli: "Why Is Our Diplomacy In a Blind Alley Regarding the Albanian Question?"]

[Text] Our president's foreign policy has recently been marked by intensive visits abroad and receptions of numerous foreign dignitaries in Tirana. Leaving aside the frills of expanding bilateral links, various possible fields of investment in Albania, and promises by our friends (that in fact have remained only on paper), the dialogue has always been focused on the problem of Kosova and its future, which is our nation's number one problem. This problem has become more acute in view of the close prospect of a solution to the Bosnian-Serbian conflict and the creation of a Bosnian-Croat Federation. In this respect, there is a lot of talk about the danger of the war spreading toward southern Serbia, into Kosova and beyond. Warnings and predictions that such an

extension of the conflict would involve several Balkan countries come from various quarters. In order to avoid a new Balkan war, almost all European and Balkan diplomatic circles, in conjunction with the United States, are insisting that the Albanian issue be sacrificed. Calls of alarm and intimidation are heard by the Albanians from all sides: "Be careful! Keep calm, control yourselves, and be wise enough not to anger Serbia. We are ready to help you in everything, provided you give up the idea of a 'Kosova Republic' or 'an independent and neutral state of Kosova.' Hold on and be patient, just be patient" (meaning "submit, submit, always submit").

Our diplomacy seems to be greatly committed to the solution of the Kosova issue and the problem of all the other Albanians living outside their motherland. As already mentioned above, there is a lot of talk going on, interviews given, and articles written. However, what will be the ultimate outcome of it all?

President Berisha's diplomatic mission in March 1994 to London—a traditionally anti-Albanian capital as far as the Kosova problem, and therefore the Albanian problem, are concerned—was evidence of our national policy succumbing to the request, or rather the European and U.S. decision, that Albania be compelled to accept "enlarged autonomy" for Kosova under the former Yugoslavia. Even that kind of autonomy—and one never knows what is actually meant by the term "enlarged"—could be achieved only if Serbia were to accept it. President Rugova's line for Kosova to be "an independent, neutral state under UN control" still hangs in the air. London, for the third time this century, has buried our hopes of liberating Kosova from the Serbian-Slav yoke. The Albanians' policy of peace and restraint in the face of the barbarous Serbian repression, a policy that was highly commended on both sides of the Atlantic, resulted almost in suicide. International diplomacy again left the Albanians in the lurch with an extremely bitter taste of frustration and disappointment, but this time the reasons for it included also our political naivete, tribal ego-tripping, and national disunity.

Leaving the British capital with a feeling of legitimate anger and admirable energy, our president found himself two days later in Turkey, where he was received with the highest honors. It is clear that all this haste had nothing to do with either the signing of an agreement, the lifting of reciprocal taxes, the smooth payment of the debt we owe Turkey, or boosting Turkish investment in Albania.

His main concern was again the Kosova issue, where he hoped that the failure suffered in London would in some way or another be compensated by support offered to us by our traditional friend. From what we could learn from the interview given by Turkish President Demirel to Albanian Television journalist Reis Cico about the stand that Turkey would take if the Serbs spread the conflict toward Kosova, the Turkish leader replied that "we will assist Kosova and Albania"—a declaration of particular importance. However, that declaration did not speak of any support for the Kosova people's desire for self-determination, and far less did it mention any Turkish acceptance of Kosova as an independent, neutral state being an option. Why then did Mr. Cico not ask the Turkish president this question, which constitutes the Albanians' fundamental national problem? It is not difficult to understand the reason for such "carelessness." We think, as far as this problem is concerned, that it is because our president's visit to Ankara had extremely bitter results. It seems our Islamic ally is much more interested in reviving its ancient influence on our troubled peninsula, solving the Serbian-Bosnian conflict, and creating an independent Bosnian state, than in creating a neutral state of Kosova, independent of Serbia. At the same time, Demirel's fatherland cannot opt out of implementing the other NATO countries' policy. Its aid toward Albania also has to be within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. It could raise certain objections to the EC sluggishness over the Balkan crisis, but not to the sluggishness over the Albanian-Serb issue. Moreover, one must not forget the strained Greek-Turkish relations over the Cyprus affair, and Turkey's desire to play a prominent role in the Black Sea countries' cooperation project.

The conclusion is that the Turkish rejection of our option for Kosova was yet another failure of our diplomacy following the one in London. On his return to Albania, President Berisha on 8 April met with another top dignitary, a Western one—the commander-in-chief of NATO troops in Europe, U.S. Army General George Joulwan. During the talks, our president assured the general that Albania would fulfill all her obligations stemming from the Partnership for Peace agreement with the utmost readiness and devotion. It became clear from those talks (as far as we could learn from the television) that our President Berisha was mainly asking NATO to guarantee Albania's independence against any possible Serbian-Montenegrin aggression. Yet the Kosova problem was once more left out of the discussions, and thus out of NATO's concern.

The commander-in-chief of the great Western military alliance showed considerable interest in, and remained very satisfied with, the airfields, port facilities, and military bases that Albania, as a country of strategic importance in the region, has put at NATO's unconditional disposal. As for our national question—the Kosova question—not a single word was uttered by the U.S. army general (again according to what was said on the television) during a news conference by [Albanian Minister of Defense] Zhulali and Joulwan. Berisha's request for increased U.S. presence in the region has to do with the Balkan crisis, the restoration of peace in Bosnia, and the prevention of the conflict from spreading toward southern Yugoslavia, rather than with the Kosova people's aspiration for an independent and neutral state.

Finally, there are the results of the talks with Klaus Kinkel, German vice chancellor and foreign minister. He assured Albania of support in all fields, promising

heaven and earth. However, as for the Kosova issue, nothing concrete was promised, because, as it transpired from the discussions, the German minister gained the impression that even his Albanian interlocutors did not know precisely what they wanted.

Why, then, has our diplomacy entered a blind alley over the Kosova issue—the problem of our entire nation? There are a great number of reasons that require individual, deep analysis—well- argued, mature, analysis showing patriotic courage. In this analysis we are going to deal with just one of them. Our Albanian diplomacy, on both sides of the border, does not have any national political platform. The commendable work by certain political and intellectual forces to chart a unified and binding national policy has been attacked and sabotaged by the Albanian state and its ruling parties. Our Albanian diplomacy is faced with an impasse, and it will never result in any achievements, because it is unable (or unwilling) to devise a just resolution of the Albanian question, which is not only a problem relating to Kosova. It has not properly formulated the options that it has presented to the world, and, which is worse, it has mangled them, reducing to an absurd level the will expressed in a referendum by the Kosova people living in their own lands occupied by the Serbs. There can never be any prospect of success for a policy or diplomacy that fails to tackle the Albanian problem as a whole, including the Kosova issue as its indisputably main constituent part. The creation of a union of all Albanians living in their ethnic territories will be the only good solution for the Albanians, the Balkans, Europe, as well as Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] themselves.

Report on Violation of Iraqi Embargo Denied

AU0905164594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] In connection with articles that appeared in Iraqi newspapers citing Ankara Radio as their source, the Press Center of the Council of Ministers has been authorized to announce that the Bulgarian Government has not allowed any violation of the embargo against Iraq, imposed on the basis of Resolutions 407 and 715 of the UN Security Council.

Zhelev Discusses Delays in Land Reform

AU0805144794 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 3 May 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev by Nevena Petrova; place and date not given: "No Deputy Will Be Held Responsible for Corruption as Long as He Is Protected by Immunity"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Petrova] What prevents us from being more successful?

[Zhelev] The reforms are not being implemented. Until now the land could have been returned five times.

[Petrova] Who is responsible for this, Mr. President?

[Zhelev] The executive power is responsible. Three governments wasted their time and did not accomplish anything. According to my assessment, the land that Berov's government really returned amounts to only 10 percent. What DURZHAVEN VESTNIK published about the land that has really been returned does not correspond to the truth. (Editorial note: According to the most recent data published by the National Statistics Institute, previous owners have claimed 52,520,000 decares of agrarian land. Some 28,877,000 decares have been returned to private owners, and this represents 47.4 percent of the total land that has been claimed.) What the newspaper refers to is rather acknowledging ownership without issuing an appropriate document or determining the borders of the plots.

[Petrova] Will returning the land, a reform to which you attribute great importance, really stimulate the development of our economy?

[Zhelev] Naturally, there will be only a few people who will be able to establish solid agrarian companies. In the next 5-10 years in Bulgaria the cooperative form will be the dominating one.

[Petrova] Mr. President, after this somber assessment of what has been achieved in the last four years, what is your forecast regarding the cabinet's fate after the Easter recess?

[Zhelev] I refrain from any forecast. This is a complex issue.

[Petrova] What makes you uneasy and prevents you from answering?

[Zhelev] This is the business of the parliament. We are a constitutional state, despite the fact that our constitution is not perfect.

[Petrova] Does Bulgaria need a new or a reshuffled government?

[Zhelev] I refrain from answering, but I think that reshuffling the government is not the correct road. We must have early elections.

[Petrova] When do you think the Bulgarians will be ready to head for the polling stations?

[Zhelev] (laughing) If you want to wait for the Bulgarians to be ready for new elections.... Even when the mandate of this cabinet expires the Bulgarians will not be ready for new elections.

[Petrova] Then?

[Zhelev] The parliament members will not want to lose their privileges—salaries, Mercedes cars, immunity, and influence over the mass media. The trade unions, the extraparliamentary forces, and public opinion must be activated. They must prepare the ground for early elections. Otherwise the current parliament will do everything possible to reproduce itself.

This also is the reason why the parliament refuses to dissolve during the two months that precede the elections. No deputy will be held responsible for corruption as long as he is protected by immunity.

[Petrova] Is it true that you will personally support the candidacy of Dimitur Ludzhev as prime minister of a caretaker or normal cabinet?

[Zhelev] Ludzhev is not interested in being the prime minister in a caretaker cabinet. This will be the most stupid thing he could do, namely, to waste his possibility to enter the parliament because of serving 2-3 months as the head of a caretaker cabinet. I think that Dimitur Ludzhev is a capable politician. He could achieve a lot if he has a stable team. [passage omitted]

[Petrova] Mr. President, who is the greatest criminal in Bulgaria?

[Zhelev] (laughing) Not I.

ASP Leader Warns Against Yielding to BSP

AU0905120394 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 4 May 94 p 4

[Interview with Professor Nikolay Vasilev, chairman of the Alternative Social Liberal Party, by Elizabet Dafinova; place and date not given: "We Will Not Support a Government With a 'Pirinski' Program"]

[Text] [Dafinova] Professor Vasilev, does the ASP [Alternative Social Liberal Party] feel the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] has deceived it, after everything that has happened?

[Vasilev] One cannot compare interparty relations with relations between personalities. Nevertheless, I would like to say that the joint meeting of the NSD [New Alliance for Democracy] and DPS parliamentary group decided to walk out of parliament if Prof. Berov starts talking about specific structural changes but then fails to do anything about it. I think it is senseless for us to meet and adopt decisions if they are not fulfilled.

[Dafinova] What will [Industry] Minister Bikov do now? Will he follow Karabashev, as the ASP has recommended, or will he rely on someone else's support—perhaps the DPS?

[Vasilev] Minister Bikov's seat is firm. If he wants to stay in the cabinet, it is certain he will do so. However, if the government fails to change its formula and its economic policy, we will not only withdraw our support, but will also cease to take part in the government. From this point on, the problem is a personal one. Bikov must decide himself what to do.

[Dafinova] At the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] rally on 1 May, Zhan Videnov said that he gives this cabinet another 30-40 days. Some people drew a connection with Valentin Karabashev's gesture and predict that the ex-deputy prime minister will be the next prime minister. Is this possible? With whose support will this happen, with the help of the BSP?

[Vasilev] Naturally, Valentin Karabashev may become the next prime minister, but it may also be someone else. As far as I am concerned, this government is already finished. The government that we supported until now was different, with a different program. We will not support a government with a "Pirinski" program. I hope the DPS will also understand this, that it is not merely a matter of certain personnel changes, but of changes in the government's policies. The government has started carrying out a communist economic program. The Communists' claims have gone beyond all reason.

[Dafinova] Nonetheless, is the ASP considering continuing its talks about the cabinet with the other political forces?

[Vasilev] The NSD parliamentary group has reached a firm decision that from now on it will not negotiate with either the BSP or Berov's government. We will hold the door open only for the DPS and SDS, and for the individual SDS parties, of course.

NSD Threatens To Withdraw Cabinet Support

AU0905103494 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 6 May 94 p 2

[KONTINENT staff report]

[Text] Yesterday the leaders of the ASP [Alternative Social Liberal Party] issued a reminder that the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] deputies could not muster 121 votes, the minimum needed for parliament to adopt decisions. ASP Organizational Secretary Vasil Velinov said that if Berov gives in to all the BSP's demands for cabinet changes, he will have to propose them in a half-empty chamber, thus delivering an unmistakable hint that the deputies in the NSD [New Alliance for Democracy] group would simply boycott parliament if Berov were to reach full accord with the Socialists.

The ASP leaders have no intention of meeting or holding consultations with the BSP or Berov. According to Velinov, with the DPS they had merely held "free discussions" that produced no concrete results, and that they would have a meeting with the Center for New Policy after the latter's national conference in Veliko Turnovo at the end of the week.

The position of the ASP on whether it would support the cabinet and on the forthcoming structural and personnel changes in the cabinet should become known after the meeting of the ASP Political Council next Tuesday [10 May].

Following a further meeting between Berov and the BSP, it became clear that the BSP would find out on Monday how many posts it will obtain in the imminent cabinet shuffle. Berov is to announce the new names in parliament on Wednesday 11 May. Despite having been given a written document explaining the concept behind the cabinet changes, the Socialist leadership is reportedly not satisfied and has established differences in principle with Berov's intentions. At their last meeting with Berov, the BSP leaders reported did not accept the prime minister's idea of converting the power industry and forestry committees into ministries and of merging the tourism and trade departments.

Internal Security Units Formed at Ministries

AU0905160294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] According to a government decision, units in charge of security and guarding facts, information, and objects that represent state security have been formed at the Council of Ministers, certain ministries, enterprises in the military-industrial complex, industrial plants, and representations across the border. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for the payroll and wages of these units' personnel. The employees will be officers of the National Security Service and the regional services.

Republic Gains WEU Associate Partner Status

LD0905173994 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 9 May 94

[Excerpts] *The Czech Republic gained associate partner status in the West European Union [WEU] today. This took place at a session of a WEU consultative forum which was attended by Foreign Affairs Minister Josef Zieleniec and Defense Minister Antonin Baudys. Our special correspondent Klara Stejskalova reports from Luxembourg:*

[Stejskalova] The WEU is the only European organization with authority on security questions. It brings together 10 countries of the European Twelve. The countries of eastern and central Europe—that is, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the three Baltic republics, apart from the Czech Republic—have so far had observer status only. Associate partner status means, according to Jozef Zieleniec, that our contact with the WEU will cease to be diplomatic and will become a working one. This means that we are becoming more and more a part of the mechanism of European integration. He said the WEU will now become an organization that will gradually take over the role of security guarantor in Europe.

Today can be marked as significant. At last we can participate, by our vote, in formulating various aspects of policy; for example, a center for planning European identity has been formed, among other things. [passage omitted]

On the other hand one has to admit that the associate countries can take part in discussions, but cannot block decisions. Associate status is thus, to some extent, a mere formality which certainly does not mean an increase in our security.

Army Admits 'Serious' Shortcomings in Management

AU0905150694 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 3 May 94 p 2

[Report by Petr Bakovsky: "Army Admits Shortcomings Ascertained by Supreme Inspection Office"]

[Text] The Army does not intend to call in question the results of an inquiry by the Supreme Inspection Office [NKU], which uncovered serious systemic shortcomings in the management of surplus and otherwise unusable Army material. The Ministry of Defense Press Department confirmed this to our daily.

The inquiry, which focused on the 1990-93 period, ascertained numerous violations of laws, decrees, and legal regulations. The final NKU report refers to systemic shortcomings appearing, in particular, in the years 1990-92. For example, the Army unlawfully sold the Struzna, Kanice, and Neznasov chateaux, which are registered as historical monuments, although it was under an obligation to offer them to the state before selling them.

The Ministry of Defense confirmed that the data contained in the NKU report conforms with reality. According to the ministry's Press Department, "the NKU officials' specific findings cannot be called in question." The Press Department statement notes that, after assuming office, Defense Minister Antonin Baudys arrived at the same results, which is why he banned all property transfers until a new system of management with surplus property is worked out. According to the ministry, the new system is transparent, easily verifiable, and fully in accordance with valid laws.

All officials responsible for violations of legal norms had without exception been recalled from their posts, according to Ministry of Defense data. Antonin Baudys also asked the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office to investigate whether criminal offenses had been committed when transferring the Army's real estate to other persons. The Chief Military Prosecutor's Office stated, however, that the facts that have been ascertained are not sufficient to warrant criminal proceedings. The Military Police has therefore been charged with investigating the matter further. The results of its efforts thus far have been negative, however, according to the Ministry of Defense Press Department.

Minister Baudys Approves Report

AU0905161694 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 4 May 94 p 2

["(jis)"-signed report: "Minister Baudys Has Approved the Supreme Inspection Office's Report"]

[Text] Prague—"I agree with the report of the Supreme Inspection Office [NKU] and I consider it to be quite correct," said Defense Minister Antonin Baudys apropos the NKU report on economic management in the Czech Army.

It is apparent from the report that the regulations on the protection of state property were violated in the years 1990-92. The minister said that, when he took up his post, he halted the transfer of all property until new mechanisms were approved for the sale of real estate and chattels and that all the functionaries responsible for violating the regulations had been discharged. At the same time, he suggested to the main Military Prosecutor's Office that it consider whether any crimes had been committed. It released a statement in which it said that the findings were not sufficient to justify suspicion of criminal activity. Last week, the government approved material on the sale of real estate with the proviso that state administration bodies be given the option of having it transferred to them free of charge. Other property will be sold at auction by real estate agencies or will be exchanged for apartments. Special materials, such as weapons and munition, will be sold to interested parties who hold a special license for trading in these goods.

Ministry, Kinkel Disagree on Sudeten Issue

AU0905191894 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 7 May 94 p 1

["lic"-signed report: "Unlike Klaus Kinkel, Czech Diplomacy Regards the Sudeten German Issue as Closed"]

[Text] Prague—According to Michal Lobkowicz, senior director of the cabinet [vrchni reditel kabinetu] of the Czech minister of foreign affairs, the leadership of Czech foreign policy regards the issue of Sudeten Germans as closed. Lobkowicz thus reacted indirectly to German Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel's statement of Wednesday [4 May], in which he called the issue of the deported Germans' freedom to settle and property rights an "unsolved and open" problem in relations between the two countries.

According to some sources, Kinkel's statement is proof that Bonn wants to discuss the Sudeten German issue at government level. "The Czech Republic regards the issue of the Sudeten Germans as closed. This is not some optimistic assertion, it is our position," Michal Lobkowicz stated literally.

"I do not consider it highly probable that the German side would wish to reopen the Sudeten German problem," he added. The senior director of the cabinet of the minister of foreign affairs refused to specifically comment on Kinkel's statement on the ground that he had not yet received its exact wording. "However, the Ministry has already taken steps to obtain more detailed information about the whole matter. This information should become available within the next few hours or days," Lobkowicz went on to say. At a meeting on Thursday [5 May] with a group of politicians from the Bundestag group of the ruling Christian CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] parties who represent expellees' organizations, Minister Kinkel said, furthermore, that the Federal Government would continue to stand up for the interests of Germans who had been expelled from eastern countries after the war. It will also do everything it can to support the interests of those afflicted and to bring about an interstate dialogue on this problem. At the same time, however, Kinkel said that Germany's foremost task in relation to its eastern neighbors was to support and assist in the reforms and in stabilizing the situation in those countries.

Klaus on Jewish Property Law, Palestinian Issue

AU1005084694 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 7 May 94 p 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci; place and date not given: "Exception Made With Regard to Jewish Property Cannot Be Repeated"]

[Text] [Krejci] Why did the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] back away from its position regarding the restitution of property to Jewish physical persons and why did it allow that communities be designated by law as dutiful persons [povinne osoby], that is, those obliged to hand out property? After all, it was clearly to be expected that the coalition partners would use this as a precedent during the discussion on the restitution of church property, which is exactly what has happened. Will it not be difficult to explain, and defend, that a principle that applies to one type of property does not apply to another type, that is, to church property?

[Klaus] I and, I think, also the overwhelming majority of ODS members consider the exception made with regard to Jewish property not repeatable, singular, and unique. This exception is due to the quite extraordinary suffering of citizens of Jewish origin during World War II. It does not mean any precedent, however, and nothing of this sort can be repeated.

[Krejci] The ODS is preparing a specific proposal for a complete stop after restitutions. What will it look like and on what will it be based?

[Klaus] The ODS Executive Council will deal with a complete stop after restitutions this weekend and I hope that we will make progress on this issue. It is precisely the variant of the restitution of Jewish property that was approved by Parliament last week that is causing the ODS to speed up the work on the proposal for a complete stop on restitution.

[Krejci] The treaty on Palestinian autonomy has been signed. On the one hand, there is the view that this process is really leading toward peace in the region. On the other hand, according to other voices, this is the beginning of new conflicts with a potentially very tragic ending. What is your opinion?

[Klaus] Such matters as this are very difficult to assess from the outside. Czechoslovakia's partition is the best example of that. We knew at that moment that partition was unavoidable. I can exceptionally agree with [Deputy Foreign Minister] Mr. Bratinka that it was a contribution toward calm and peace in Europe. I remember well, however, that assessments from the outside were quite different. Therefore, I really would not dare predict whether this step, that is, the formation of Palestinian autonomy, will contribute to internal peace between Jews and Arabs and I believe that no one else should dare make that judgment.

During my visit to Israel I spoke with Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres, both of whom were pinning all their hopes on this step. Those familiar with their past know that the two had not always been such dovish characters, wanting to make peace at any price. They had often sided with advocates of a more vigorous solution to this issue. I believe, however, that they have now arrived at a mature and balanced conclusion.

There can be no doubt that the signing of the agreement on Palestinian autonomy will not bring peace overnight. In the short run, unrest in these territories could even grow stronger and the very first hours already suggest that this may very well be the case. I do not think, however, that there is any other path toward peace.

Roman Kovac Rejects Corruption Charges

AU1005100894 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 May 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Roman Kovac by Julius Gembicky; place and date not given: "The Aim Was Not To Bring About My Dismissal But To Besmirch Me"]

[Text] Bratislava—The extraordinary 31st meeting of Parliament started after midnight, that is, actually, on Thursday [5 May]. The sole point on the agenda was a motion by a group of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] deputies that Roman Kovac be recalled from the post of deputy prime minister. The 100 minutes of a pitiful debate without any conclusive arguments in support of the accusations were concluded by a vote. The first attempt to wipe out the coalition government minister by minister did not come off.

[Gembicky] Deputy prime minister, did you have any idea about the specific contents of the accusations?

[Kovac] We have known about the HZDS tactics to propose dismissals of government members for about three weeks. They were laid down by Vladimir Meciar in the HZDS Club of Deputies. In line with these tactics, at every plenary meeting of Parliament they will come up with at least one motion to recall a member of the coalition government. I do not know whether I should consider it an honor that I was chosen as the first target. We did expect, however, that one of the former collaborators, who have now automatically become the biggest enemies for the HZDS, would be chosen first. I knew very little about the accusations cited in the motion—that they concerned the inability to cope with the post of deputy prime minister, a suspected attempt at corruption, and a flawed moral profile. That was all I knew.

[Gembicky] But already at that time reports were leaked from HZDS lobbies that the matter supposedly concerned an order for Siemens medical appliances....

[Kovac] The problem is that not a single specific accusation was raised by HZDS deputies in Parliament. They only wanted to discredit me in the eyes of the public. They will never prove what they accused me of. I knew that the proposal to recall me would be put forward by Mr. Masiar. His speech was followed by statements by a group of female HZDS deputies. That came as a surprise to me, and so did the statement by deputy J. Rea, who is a deeply religious man. While working at the Government Office, we used to go to the chapel for services together. It took my breath away that he, as a Christian, lowered himself and put his signature to such a heap of lies. The paradoxical thing is that I was hardly involved in the whole Siemens case. I met the firm's representatives only when they presented their offer to extend a loan to Slovakia. I was unable to assess how advantageous the terms of the loan were, which is why I invited Finance Minister Julius Toth, who was to assess the quality and specifications of the loan, as well as Health Minister Vilian Sobona to attend the talks. That was my first and last meeting with Siemens representatives. Ultimately, the agreement was signed by Viliam Sobona and handed over to Siemens by Vladimir Meciar.

[Gembicky] Your signature did not figure under the agreement?

[Kovac] No. And I was not invited to any subsequent talks. I came across the offer from Siemens once more when this material was submitted to a meeting of the cabinet that I happened to chair. It is remarkable that, originally, it had been submitted to the government as a financial credit but the Slovak National Bank governor objected that it was not a financial credit but a supplier's credit. Besides, the material had not been supplemented with any mention of a competitive tender. There were also objections to the repayment timetable, which is why we withdraw the item from the agenda. That was all.

[Gembicky] On Wednesday [4 May] evening, speaking at the Na Pasienkoch indoor stadium, former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar also accused you of having embezzled $5 million earmarked for media policy....

[Kovac] Deputy J. Rea, too, reiterated this absurdity later that night. The sum of $5 million is an enormous one. It is not customary to give sums of this magnitude as a bribe. I would never be able to accept such money and, if I could, then only for state coffers to subsidize much needed and loss-generating periodicals, such as children's periodicals.

[Gembicky] You supposedly brought it up at a government meeting?

[Kovac] I beg your pardon, if someone wanted to collect such a sum in dollars, would he bring it up at a government meeting? This is ludicrous....

[Gembicky] But supposedly there are witnesses....

[Kovac] When J. Rea uttered these accusations, not a single former member of the government—three of whom were present—got up and said that this was true.

[Gembicky] One cannot seek redress in court against something that was said in Parliament. What about the things that were said at the rally at Na Pasienkoch?

[Kovac] I must get hold of the exact transcript of the rally. Then I will decide whether to seek redress in court. I believe, however, that the HZDS will be sued by Siemens, which has been accused of being a corrupt firm.

[Gembicky] How did your coalition partners respond to the accusations?

[Kovac] The aim was absolutely clear to everyone. I appreciate their statements.

[Gembicky] In what way did you fail to cope with the post of deputy prime minister, according to the motion?

[Kovac] I supposedly did not cope with the management of ministries. However, I was only supposed to coordinate their activity. Furthermore, I supposedly bear my share of responsibility for the catastrophic situation in the health services. But I did not run the ministry. Quite the contrary, I beseeched Vladimir Meciar not to recommend Viliam Sobona for that post and asked him five times to recall him from it. Deputy Meciar denied this, even though witnesses were present. They also blame me for having established an advisory commission to analyze the situation in the health services. My third sin concerns the dispute between [former Health Minister] Sobona and [former Minister of Labor and Social Affairs] Keltosova over the concept of the National Insurance Company. I have also been accused of failure to cope with the tripartite council, even though I succeeded in maintaining social peace in a complicated situation when unpopular measures had to be taken. Nor did I obstruct the signing of the general agreement [between government, employers, and trade unions]. It was [Finance Minister] Julius Toth who vetoed the acceptance of the social fund. Trade unionists could confirm my words. At night, after recalling me from the government, they sent a car to Piestany to fetch [chairman of the Confederation of Trade Unions] Alojz Englis and [chairman of the Employers' Association] Mr. Lach in order to sign the general agreement early in the morning, after an unnecessary delay of six weeks. It was necessary to prove that things work better without Kovac.

[Gembicky] And what about the moral accusation that, by your personal approach, you stood in the way of an HZDS-Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] coalition?

[Kovac] This coalition had been blocked by a decision of the HZDS national leadership, not by me. Some HZDS deputy even accused me of having actually changed the history of Slovakia. The best reply to this accusation was given by [SDL Chairman] Peter Weiss.

[Gembicky] What affected you most strongly about the accusations raised by your former colleagues from the HZDS?

[Kovac] I am grateful to those people from the HZDS who refused to sign the motion that I be recalled. However, some of the 35 names [that signed the motion] did surprise me.

[Gembicky] Could you be more specific?

[Kovac] Yes. I was surprised by the readiness of deputies Aibekova, Valcekova, and Romanovska to put their signatures to the motion.

Right-Wing Groups Respond to KDH Offer

AU0905083694

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 4 May on page 1 publishes a 300-word statement issued by the Standing Conference of the Civic Institute (SKOI) in response to the offer advanced by the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) to "right-wing groupings and personalities with similar political views" to participate in the forthcoming parliamentary elections on the KDH slate of candidates. The KDH offer, and unification of Slovak right-wing parties in general, are also the subject of an 800-word interview with Ludovit Cernak, chairman of the National Democratic Party (NDS)-New Alternative, by Alena Gottweisova in Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 4 May on page 2. The interview, the place and date of which are not given, is published under the headline "Options of a Joint Course of Action."

The SKOI statement welcomes the KDH offer as an opportunity to unite "civic and Christian democratic forces in Slovakia." It states: "We receive with satisfaction the KDH's opening toward civic democratic forces, which we understand as a historic step toward overcoming mutual differences and toward the actual amalgamation of Christian democratic forces in Slovakia." Referring to the fragmentation of the right-wing vote in the 1992 elections, the SKOI statement proclaims that "the mistakes of the year 1992 must not be repeated" and calls on "all civic democratic forces that want to share in the KDH's and SKOI's common work to follow our path of unification of civic and Christian democratic forces in Slovakia."

Cernak's reaction to the KDH offer is more reserved. The relevant passage in the SLOVENSKY DENNIK interview reads:

[Gottweisova] "The unification of right-wing forces is the topic of the day. Representatives of the KDH, Democratic Party (DS), the Democratic Union of Slovakia (DEUS), the Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen, and the NDS have agreed to cooperate. One option foresees the formation of a single entity, the other option is represented by KDH's offer to reserve places for representatives of other parties on its own slate of candidates. Which option is more promising, in your opinion?"

[Cernak] "It is premature to say which option would be better. During the meeting of parties of the right center we noted that all of them are interested in cooperation. Unfortunately, some subsequent statements did not quite confirm this readiness. The KDH has put forward its idea, I and my party colleagues will prepare other possible alternatives. We have to realize that we would suffer terrible defeat in the eyes of the Slovak public if we kept meeting for two months, kept proclaiming that we want to cooperate, and, ultimately, failed to agree on the form of this cooperation. That would be the worst possible alternative. Creating a single entity is unrealistic, however, in my opinion because, in view of differences in programs, the liberally oriented DEUS cannot merge with the KDH. We can proceed jointly in a coalition bloc or establish a grouping within the framework of the center and right center. I am an advocate of joint course of action by the widest possible current,

which is why I would prefer the formation of a coalition bloc, within the framework of which those five entities, plus, possibly, a sixth one, would nominate their candidates. We would be able to expect a relatively good result in that case. The voter can, moreover, influence the result by means of preferential votes. I would therefore accept, for example, a procedure with a single slate of candidates whereby, in the event of electoral success, he who gets the largest number of preferential votes would form the government. This option does not seem to be feasible, however, in view of certain antagonisms existing among individual parties." Asked about the "sixth potential partner," Cernak says that he was thinking of the Christian Social Union (KSU), which has reportedly abandoned the idea of cooperating with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and "has left the door open for talks with other political entities." Cernak concedes, however, that the presence of the KSU in such a right-wing bloc might deter some potential right-wing voters.

Country Seen as Prey to 'Foreign Interests'

AU0905151694

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 3 May on page 10, under the headline "New 'Lessons From the Crisis-Ridden Development,'" carries a 4,500-word paper signed by Augustin Marian Huska, deputy chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), which analyzes the "ten most serious mistakes" in the HZDS's activity. The text is preceded by an introductory passage, which notes: "Materials of unclear and even dubious origin appear on our editorial desk from time to time. The one that we submit to you today carries the type-written signature of A.M. Huska, the architect of HZDS ideology. The style and ideas really indicate his authorship, or the authorship of someone who is his brilliant imitator."

In the text itself, the author identifies the following "ten most serious mistakes" in the HZDS's activity—underestimation of the influence of foreign interests in Slovakia; insufficient personnel work; priority given to "tactical improvisation over strategic concepts"; failure to tap the intellectual potential of the so-called HZDS professional clubs; complacency of the HZDS apparatus; failure to show that HZDS policies "follow up on the spiritual and cultural traditions of the nation"; ineffective cooperation with academics and researchers; lack of team work; failure to activate the young generation; and poor cooperation with the media.

Speaking about the first point, the author says: "The complex geopolitical situation and the power vacuum in Central Europe have activated neighboring countries and the centers of world influence to assert their selfish interests. The manipulatory circles became active particularly when they discovered that Meciar's government wanted to consistently protect Slovak state interests. A power struggle is at play, designed to secure the dominance of foreign interests in the republic and testing citizens' resilience to this influence. The aim of these foreign interests is a weak government (that is, one that is 'cooperative' and ready for 'compromise'). It is necessary to get to know the foreign interests' lines of force and find abroad allies for preserving Slovakia's sovereignty. It is necessary to make use of the contradictory nature of foreign interests in order to mutually neutralize them. It is necessary to systematically explain the danger arising from domestic circles' links with these foreign interests. It is necessary to expose the opportunistic two-facedness of domestic political forces that profit in a parasitical way from the identity between their own and foreign interests. It is necessary to launch extensive propaganda so that the state interests of Slovakia become the framework for assessing the legitimacy of all other interests operating here."

In Huska's opinion, the "foreign forces" make use of the doctrine of "cosmopolitism" as an "instrument to enforce their own dominance" and promote the "so-called civic society with the aim of halting the process of emancipation in Slovakia."

Ministry Outlines Coupon Privatization Plans

AU0605161594 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 May 94 pp 1-2

["is"-signed report: "First Round of Coupon Privatization Could Start on 2 January 1995"]

[Text] Bratislava—Between 1 July 1992 and 15 March 1994 [term of office of Vladimir Meciar's cabinet], only 232 privatization projects went through the process of approval, all of which proposed standard privatization methods, states the Report on Securing Supply of Property for the Second Wave of Coupon Privatization (hereafter referred to as "report"), drafted by the Ministry of Privatization.

This, which testifies to the slowing down of the pace of privatization, has also prompted the present government to incorporate into its Policy Statement the preparation of the second wave of coupon privatization. For the sake of comparison, the offer for the first wave of coupon privatization consisted of more than 500 shareholding companies.

The Ministry of Privatization report proposes that the registration of citizens and investment privatization funds take place from 1 September to 31 October 1994, the processing and assessment of registrations from 1 to 7 November 1994, the preliminary round—the subscribing of points to investment privatization funds—from 3 October to 16 December 1994, and the presentation of the list of shareholders and investment privatization funds from 19 December to 30 December 1994.

Preliminary dates of individual rounds for placing orders:

First Round: 2-25 January 1995

Second Round: 6-17 February 1995

Third Round: 6-17 March 1995

Fourth Round: 3-14 April 1995

Fifth Round: 2-12 May 1995

As the report states, the Ministry of Privatization has drawn up a preliminary list of property offered for the second wave of coupon privatization. Included in the list are 104 industrial enterprises with an aggregate book value of 152.9 billion Slovak korunas [Sk], of which Sk72.5 billion (47 percent) is earmarked for privatization by means of coupons; 43 agricultural enterprises with an aggregate book value of Sk10.6 billion, of which Sk4.8 billion (47 percent) is earmarked for coupon privatization; and 36 enterprises from the branches of transportation, tourism, retailing, and services with an aggregate value of Sk19.4 billion, of which Sk7.6 billion (39 percent) is earmarked for coupon privatization. In addition, some of the "unsold" shares from the first wave of coupon privatization, which are currently in the portfolio of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic, as well as shares which the National Property Fund acquired within the framework of increases in shareholding companies' capital stock for reason of reassessment of real estate value, should also be offered to coupon holders within the second wave of coupon privatization. "All together, it is thus possible to offer Sk100 to Sk105 billion worth of property within the second wave of coupon privatization," the report states. The Ministry of Privatization has recently intensified the preparatory work for the second wave of coupon privatization. A part of the ministry's staff is working at an outlying workplace out of Bratislava lest the increased work intensity be disrupted by the routine agenda and by dealing with inquiries.

Moravcik: Payment Agreement May Be Changed

AU1005055894 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 May 94 p 1

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik by Vladimir Popelka; place and date not given: "The Payments Agreement Needs To Be Changed"]

[Text] [Popelka] According to some reports, you are supposed to meet with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. Klaus, however, sees no reason for such a meeting to take place. Do you see a reason for it?

[Moravcik] I agree with the Czech prime minister on this point. A meeting of the prime ministers becomes important when experts, ministers, or deputy prime ministers are unable to clarify contentious issues. Our meeting would have to concern a wider range of issues. We are not in a situation where we would feel that such a meeting is necessary.

[Popelka] Is the situation surrounding the so-called old clearing account not a reason for such a meeting to take place, as recently suggested by Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmognerova?

[Moravcik] Not all possibilities of bilateral negotiations have been exhausted in this case. Some new aspects have surfaced. The problem is that the basic payments agreement was disadvantageous for Slovakia. The agreement on payments for the old clearing account provides for compensation for the difference in the exchange rates [of the Czech and Slovak korunas] from the state budget. This is a burden on the Slovak state budget. While negotiating the agreement, the Slovak side apparently did not calculate bilateral claims well enough and did not realize that we are worse off than the Czechs. This is why we came up with the idea of abolishing the old clearing account. The true gist of the problem, in my opinion, is that the payments agreement needs to be changed, but the Czechs are not interested in this because the present state suits them.

[Popelka] The opposition has repeatedly referred to you in connection with the club of the "Leninist spark." What kind of a club is this, in fact?

[Moravcik] It was set up after we gained the impression that the thinking represented by Mikhail Gorbachev was not applied in Slovakia. The club's task was to bring together people who realized the need for more radical changes. The name "Leninist spark" was only a camouflage designed to hoodwink the StB [State Security Corps]. The organizers are registered in StB files because later they were rated as candidates for the criminal act of sedition.

MSZP Spells Out Partnership Criteria

LD0905173294 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 9 May 94

[Excerpt] Party leaders have drawn the first conclusions from yesterday's election round. Kata Peli Nagy went to a press briefing by the Socialists.

[Peli Nagy] To preserve, to renew, and to surpass—these are the guidelines for the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] after its partial victory yesterday; that is, to preserve the values of the past four years and to achieve what the previous government forgot to accomplish. So there will be no big clearout, or even a little one. This was confirmed by Zoltan Gal, leader of the MSZP parliamentary group.

The intention behind these tactics, according to the party, is that the position of the left has to be consolidated during the next four years and this can only be accomplished through successful governing.

Talking about the more and more pressing coalition questions, Imre Szekeres confirmed that a decision will only be made after the second round. However, he listed four criteria which will form the basis of negotiations. The most decisive factor in choosing partners will be to establish an agreement about the first six months' government program, about the structure and style of the new government, and on whether the other partner will be able to accept that negotiations will have to be carried out with the civil and interest protection organizations.

Szekeres announced that the MSZP does not regard Gabor Kuncze, Viktor Orban, Laszlo Surjan, Jozsef Torgyan, or Peter Boross as prime minister candidates of the MSZP. Even in case of an absolute majority they would like to unite the country's best forces. [passage omitted]

Seeks Broadest Coalition Government

LD1005113994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 10 May 94

[Text] According to Imre Szekeres, executive deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], if the MSZP wins the elections, the return of the nomenclature which existed four years ago is out of the question. Szekeres, speaking on the "Sunrise" program on Hungarian television, confirmed that even if the MSZP obtains the absolute majority of the votes, it would consider it necessary to have the broadest possible coalition government. Although many expect it, the MSZP does not intend to bring the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] into the government. The reason for this is the KDNP's performance over the past four years.

Imre Szekeres and Ivan Petoe, chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats, who also participated in the TV program, both agreed that the tone of the elections ought not to change in the second round. In their view, the voters should concentrate on the individual candidates of the parties, and it would be desirable if these candidates could have an opportunity to introduce themselves to the electorate on Channel 1 of Hungarian Television, and not only on cable television.

Editorial Urges Calm After Election

AU0905160494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 9 May p 3

[Editorial by Laszlo Hovanyecz: "Calmly"]

[Text] This is the big task now: To be calm—regardless of the fact that some people call the events that have happened a sweeping, annihilating victory and others call it a defeat. We must look into the future with calm.

Up to now, it was possible to talk about intrigues, falsifications, and ill-willed predictions. However, from now, we can only talk about facts; that the majority politics of recent times have failed.

The power that gained the majority in 1990 has lost the people's confidence. It can search for excuses in the international situation, in world economic recession, in the country's desperate situation, and we could carry on listing the many negative circumstances. All these do not excuse them the same way as these did not excuse the stupid actions of the previous regime. History does not grant acquittals for failures, even in situations a thousand times more difficult than what we have had. Especially that the social lifting power of the change of the regime offered exceptional opportunities after the change. Lessons can always be learned.

For the power that, in all probability, will have to say goodbye after the [second round of] elections in three weeks' time, the main lesson will obviously be that dialogue with society cannot be neglected by any political force. Those who have been leading the country up to now believed that that they infallibly knew the wishes of the "people" and the "nation." In the meantime, they humiliated the object and subject of their governing every day.

They deliberately confused the Rakosi and the Kadar regimes and the various phases of the latter. This carried the message that the people were like a flock of sheep that was waiting for a good shepherd to appear from nowhere. If someone believes and even keeps repeating that this people is waiting for "bread for 3.60" [price in forints for kilo of bread in Kadar's time], he is wrong and even deceives himself. Contrary to all belittling assumptions, Hungarian people can count very well. Rather than bread for 3.60, milk for 3, or sausage for 2, people first, second, and third want dignity. They wish for their abilities and performance to be recognized, and for their leaders to give free scope to their creative abilities. The country has mainly been disappointed in this wish in the past four years. We are probably right in assuming that this is the reason it voted the way it did.

Naturally, all this also has lessons for the future. Those newly coming to power will have to deal with the same people desiring dignity. Sober-minded politicians cannot believe that it is good to produce radical government changes every four years. To put it differently, it is not at all wise or bearable to provide the grounds for such a deep disappointment. Those coming to power as a result of this year's elections will have to assess, thoroughly, the current successes, and even more carefully, the reasons for the failure of the current losers. As a result, they will have to conclude the following. First: They have to come to an understanding with the people. Second: They have to come to an understanding with the opposition. And third: They have to prepare for both keeping and handing over power.

Assessing all this calmly, those who are coming to power will have to be clear that "their coming into position" means that they respect the nation's dignity and they interpret popular sovereignty to be supreme, above themselves.

Security Chief Views Prosecution of Hungarists

AU1005092994 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 May 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Laszlo Egerer, head of the National Security Office's Constitutional Protection Directorate, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "On the Renewed Hungarist Movement—High-Ranking National Security Leader Gives Interview to NEPSZABADSAG"]

[Text] On 5 May a Budapest court approved keeping Albert Szabo and Istvan Gyorkos, leaders of the Hungarist Movement, on remand, which had been ordered on 2 May, because of the increased danger that they might commit more crimes. We interviewed Laszlo Egerer, leader of the National Security Office's Constitutional Protection Directorate, on the background to the appearance of the successor to the former Arrow-Cross organization [Hungarian fascist organization during the Nazi period].

[Egerer] Arrow-Cross and National Socialist parties operated in Hungary from 1935, mostly following Ferenc Szalasi. The establishment of the Hungarist Movement coincided with the launching of the National Socialist Hungarian Party in March 1938. Pal Teleki's government dissolved it but, under German pressure, it again became legal under a different name and, as the Arrow-Cross Party, it came to power on 15 October 1944.

After World War II, afraid of reprisals for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by them, many members of the Hungarist Movement emigrated to various countries of the world. After emigrating, representatives and sympathizers of Arrow-Cross power established regional groups—in Australia, Canada, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Western Europe—of the Hungarist Movement. Their activities were mostly limited to publishing their internally circulating journal, UT ES CEL [ROAD AND GOAL], and to organizing local events. Personal conflicts, rivalry, and dissent by the leaders and the membership characterized this movement from the beginning. From 1945 to 1975, former Arrow- Cross leader Arpad Henney headed the movement, having been appointed by Szalasi as his political successor. After Henney's death, Imre Tatar Tarjanyi, who was living in Germany, became the movement's leader and kept this role until autumn 1993. At the time, he was a parliamentary deputy for the Arrow-Cross Party.

[Correspondent] We have arrived at the present. How has the Hungarist Movement been reorganized?

[Egerer] After the change of the regime, the Hungarist Movement's emigre organizations made contact with extreme right-wing groups in Hungary so as to make Hungarism legitimate as a political line, and to rehabilitate Szalasi's Arrow-Cross dictatorship. After 1990, many elderly activists of the movement came to Hungary and personally tried to do something to achieve these goals. In the course of this, the Hungarist Movement's representatives from Australia, Canada, and the United States made contact with Istvan Gyorkos, the leader of the illegal extreme right-wing organization the Hungarian National Front [Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal], who was accepted as the domestic representative and maintainer of Hungarist traditions. The international and domestic media coverage of the criminal proceedings launched against Gyorkos in 1992 played a part in this because this introduced him to the extreme right-wing emigre groups. Through his contacts, Gyorkos often received financial support from Western emigres to establish the Hungarist Movement in Hungary. In addition to this, extreme right-wing Hungarian propaganda publications—UT ES CEL—and reprinted books of the ideologists of Hungarism—Szalasi, Istoczy, and Marschalko—were often sent to Gyorkos and other extreme right-wing activists for further circulation.

[Correspondent] When did Albert Szabo appear?

[Egerer] He returned home on the instruction of the Hungarist Movement's Australian group. Szabo has dual Hungarian and Australian citizenship. He held discussions with Gyorkos a number of times on coordinating the operation of the extreme right-wing groups and on presenting them as a united movement. However, the Hungarian branch of the Hungarist Movement was not formed because of its poor organization, lack of social support, and mainly the individual ambitions and rivalry between Gyorkos and Szabo.

In the autumn of 1993, the Hungarist groups operating among emigres in the West jointly declared that they were appointing Istvan Gyorkos as leader of the movement because the former leader Tarjanyi, living in Germany, could not carry out the work of directing the organization. Szabo did not accept this, tried to compete with Gyorkos, and established the World National Popular Rule Party.

In spring 1994, the foreign groups of the Hungarist Movement made Gyorkos and Szabo understand that they would only continue to support them financially if they appeared as a united movement in political life. It can be attributed to this and to the lack of success in the election campaign that the establishment of the Hungarian wing of the Hungarist Movement was announced on 27 April 1994. This was primarily a symbolic act, as only 11 people signed the minutes that registered the establishment. In spite of their loud statements about the broad social support for their "movement," the number of their sympathizers does not even extend to a few hundred. The vast majority of people belonging to this movement are not clear about the ideology or history of Hungarism, have a low intellectual level, and primitive opposition to Gypsies and Jews, and chauvinism dominate their views.

On 28 April 1994, on charges of conducting extremist propaganda activities, the police instituted criminal proceedings against Gyorkos and Szabo—who call themselves the leaders of the Hungarist Movement in Hungary—on the well-grounded suspicion of incitement against the community in violation of Paragraph 269 of the Penal Code.

[Correspondent] No proceedings have been initiated started against Gyorgy Kemal Ekrem, who appeared at the movement's gatherings together with the other two people. Why not?

[Egerer] In view of the facts known to us, the well-founded suspicion of incitement against the community under Paragraph 269 of the Penal Code was not raised in his case.

Assets Company Suspends Privatization Deals

LD1005105194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 10 May 94

[Text] The State Assets Management Joint Stock Company [AVRT] has stopped the implementation of privatization deals. Agnes Papp reports on the background to this decision:

[Papp] The AVRT has suspended its sales activities and has confined its work until the formation of the new government to preparing privatization deals for decisions. This is what AVRT Managing Director Lajos Csepi told this program's correspondent. He explained his decision by saying that it is clear from the result of the first round of the parliamentary elections that the composition of the new government will be different from the old one and it is conceivable that the new government will choose a different privatization strategy, and potential new sales could limit this new concept.

On being asked why he did not respond to similar requests by the large parliamentary parties in the past, Lajos Csepi said that he needs government authorization to do it, and the government and the minister in charge of privatization have still not ordered the AVRT to suspend sales.

Claims in Bos Power Station Lawsuit Detailed

AU0905090794 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 May 94 p 3

[Text] Hungary will also ask the International Court in The Hague to conclude that Slovakia is not the "inheritor" of the CSFR-Hungarian agreement on the construction of the Bos power station, an agreement signed in 1977. We learned this from Laszlo Valki, a member of the group of Hungarian legal experts participating in the trial in The Hague, and one of the authors of the Hungarian lawsuit submitted to the International Court.

Laszlo Valki presented us with the Hungarian lawsuit consisting of eight points, a lawsuit fully written in English and submitted to the International Court in The Hague on 2 May. According to this document of claims, Hungary asks the International Court to conclude that:

1. Hungary had the right to halt and then abandon the construction in Nagymaros, as well as the construction projects it had to carry out at Bos in accordance with the agreement signed in 1977;

2. Czeckoslovakia did not have the right to build the C version (the document includes neither the expression "C version" nor the term "diversion of the Danube;" there is instead a long description, because the Slovaks only agreed to take the issue to the court in The Hague with this description);

3. Hungary abolished the 1977 agreement legitimately;

4. The 1977 agreement would have not remained in force anyway after 1 January 1993 due to the lack of a successor state;

5. Slovakia is responsible for its continued operation of the C version;

6. Slovakia is responsible for the damages and losses caused to Hungary and Hungarian citizens with the operation of the C version;

7. Slovakia is obliged to pay compensation for these damages, and Hungary will ask to set the amount of this compensation if the two sides fail to come to an agreement within six months after the International Court's decision;

8. Slovakia is obliged to fully redirect the Danube waters in the original Danube bed and restore former navigation on the river; Slovakia is also obliged to restore the original prevailing situation prior to the C version and guarantee that it will not repeat its damaging activity in the future.

Laszlo Valki described the contents of the Slovak claims in five points. According to this document, Slovakia asks the International Court to conclude the following:

1. The agreement of 1977 continues to be valid and, in this respect, Slovakia is the legal heir of the former CSSR;

2. Hungary did not have the right to halt and then abandon the construction at Nagymaros and the projects it had to carry out in the Bos area in accordance with the 1977 agreement;

3. The construction and operation of the C version was legal;

4. Hungary must halt any activity that hinders the implementation of the 1977 agreement and must continue the implementation of the stipulations of this agreement;

5. Hungary is obliged to pay compensation for all damages and losses caused to Slovakia, including interest and lost profits. The amount of this compensation will be probably be set in the second phase, following the first decision of the International Court.

As for Bratislava's desire to include a Slovak judge on the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Laszlo Valki said that this request is justified and can be implemented almost automatically.

According to the rules, if the sides in question do not have their own judges in this 15-member international body, they have the right to appoint ad-hoc judges themselves, judges who are either citizens of the countries in question or third country citizens. Given the fact that there has been a Hungarian member in this international body since last year, namely Geza Herczeg, Hungary cannot appoint another judge. Slovakia, however, can do so, but only for this affair and only for the duration of court proceedings connected with the Bos issue. His authority will be the same as that of the other judges, and his activity will be financed by the United Nations.

Institute Official Views Military Research

AU0905174694 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 7-8 May 94 p 11

["F.Z."-signed interview with Ferenc Gazdag, director of the Strategic and Defense Research Institute; place and date not given: "We Must Increase Our Military Budget"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [PESTI HIRLAP] How regular are your contacts with the Defense Ministry? How often does the Defense Ministry request analyses from your institute?

[Gazdag] Unfortunately, the system of bilateral relations has not yet fully developed. We prepare an annual work program and then all the ministry departments and state secretaries approve it. So, we have an accepted plan based partly on the type of research needed by the ministry and partly on our own offers in various fields. [passage omitted]

[PESTI HIRLAP] What research programs are currently under way?

[Gazdag] I think is it enough for me to only describe the major ones. The first such major project comprises the prevailing issues of the armed forces of the Hungarian Republic, as well as the security of Central Europe and Europe as a whole. We are now preparing a conference and a bigger publication entitled "The Security of Central Europe 1994." We call the third major research trend new challenges, new threats, and new risks. We must acknowledge the fact that, although the bipolar system has collapsed, the time of large-scale military threats is over, and there is no longer a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, the world has not become much safer either—at least, not around us. Instead of a big nuclear threat, a lot of small but real threats have emerged, including many issues that are typically not military in nature; nevertheless, the researchers must take them into consideration. The refugee issue, for example, is such an issue, and it also has security elements. The modernization of military technology and the structure of armed forces is the fourth area of our research activity. This applies exclusively to the Hungarian Defense Forces. We have a fifth area, a new area of research, namely the relations between the armed forces and the society. [passage omitted]

[PESTI HIRLAP] As far as I know, you recently visited Ukraine. What experiences did you gather?

[Gazdag] Our cooperation is extremely varied, including the mutual exchange of research materials, analyses, and studies. For example, a delegation of the scientific department of the Ukrainian Army General Staff held consultations in Hungary for a few days in the autumn of 1993. Reciprocating this meeting, Hungarian security policy experts held talks in Kiev on 26-28 April 1994. A member of the Hungarian delegation, Colonel Laszlo Nagy, also held talks with the heads of the International Research Institute on Global and Regional Security and the military policy advisers of the Ukrainian defense minister. In the course of these consultations, our experts learned a lot of useful things regarding the security policy situation of Ukraine and the state of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They concluded that the situation of Ukraine is extremely difficult: a big drop in economic performance, inflation, insolvency, and dependence on Russia. However, most of our negotiating partners were slightly more optimistic than six months ago. They told us that the drop had stopped in some areas and the many crisis situations did not break the country up. Inflation has also slowed down a little. [passage omitted]

[PESTI HIRLAP] In the case of Ukraine, the issue of nuclear weapons presents a separate problem.

[Gazdag] That is true. The tripartite Russian-Ukrainian-U.S. agreement signed in January, an agreement on Kiev joining the START I agreement, diffused the fears. Two shipments of nuclear warheads have been sent to Russia since then, and Ukraine received the

nuclear fuel for its power stations. Kiev took it upon itself to dismantle its nuclear devices at a rate stipulated by the START agreement. At the same time, Ukraine does not yet intend to join the nonproliferation agreement, although the initial antipathy toward this agreement seems to be decreasing. It is possible that Ukraine will reexamine its position in the near future. There is yet another factor in the Ukrainian policy regarding the issue of nuclear weapons. In connection with the tripartite agreement signed in Moscow, there is a Ukrainian concept that seems to be spreading among the military policy experts. According to this concept, only the mediation of a third party can lead to progress in solving the existing conflicting issues between Ukraine and Russia. The supporters of this concept would like to include a third party in the ongoing debate on Crimea and the Black Sea fleet. The United States would be the ideal third party but, if it does not accept this mission, the United Nations or other international organizations could also be considered. This concept is dangerous inasmuch as Ukraine might try to force Washington to join the Ukrainian-Russian debate by delaying the dismantling of its nuclear weapons. Although the United States repeatedly declared that it does not allow itself to be blackmailed, one cannot exclude the possibility that Kiev will turn to this doubtful method to achieve its goals. Such a step would considerably destabilize, first of all, Russian-Ukrainian relations, and this would also affect Hungary. [passage omitted]

Paper Report on East-West Business Forum

WS0605132594 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 6-8 May 94 p 1

[Report by "U.K." and "F.N.": "200 Billion Dollar Goal; East-West Business Forum"]

[Text] *Countries undergoing reforms should create favorable conditions for foreign investors, while the West should open up its markets to merchandise from the East—this is what was stressed during the first day of the meeting by participants of an East-West Business Forum being held in Warsaw.*

The forum was organized in connection with a third conference by economy, industry, and trade ministers of the seven most industrialized countries of the world (G-7) and of 10 countries undergoing reforms (E-10) [E-10: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary], which begins on 6 May. "We are eager to see the participation of foreign capital not just in bilateral joint venture-type measures but also in multilateral ties. We are counting on capital involvement in the amount of over $1 billion per year. There cannot be a good economy without a stable economic policy, and this is exactly the kind of policy that the current government intends to implement, while creating the right climate for conducting profitable business," stated Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, who is participating in the forum. According to Kolodko, Poland has already achieved significant economic results while the economy has good prospects for development.

During a discussion, the entrepreneurs were wondering what must be done to make $200 billion worth of capital flow from the G-7 countries to the E-10 countries by the year 2000. By that time, the private sector in the countries undergoing reforms should produce 70 percent of the national product while the participation of these countries in trade exchange with G-7 should reach the level of 17-20 percent (right now, it is just 6-7 percent).

High customs duties, lack of stability of legal systems, and weak promotion all make trade difficult, and they are not conducive to investments which are required, among others, in telecommunications, transportation, and road construction—the businessmen stressed.

NOWA EUROPA asked the U.S. Trade Secretary Ronald H. Brown what he expects from the conference, which is to begin Friday. "I expect," he said, "that this third conference on East-West cooperation will concentrate primarily on working out strategies within which the private sector will be able to contribute to the region's development to a larger extent than now, and also will contribute to the process of establishing new jobs. I would like to emphasize that Central and East Europe remains a very important and strategic region to us, particularly from the standpoint of the transformations taking place in the postcommunist countries. We think that the region also has a huge economic potential which the countries of East and Central Europe are trying to utilize in their striving for a market economy. The United States and all highly industrialized countries that are members of G-7 can help in this economic transformation."

Defense Ministry Official Views 'Partnership'

WS0605132794 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 5 May 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Jerzy Milewski, secretary of state a the Ministry of Defense, by Janusz B. Grochowski; place and date not given: "We Play Seriously"]

[Excerpts] [Grochowski] The Ministry of National Defense [MON] and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs very quickly prepared the presentation document for the "Partnership for Peace" program; it was then submitted to NATO representatives in Brussels. You did not hesitate to call this a great success.

[Milewski] Perhaps this is too great a word. However, we certainly achieved another very important stage in the implementation of our strategic intention, which, invariably and regardless of the activities of other states, is Poland's integration with the NATO structures. We look upon the "Partnership for Peace" program as a way of accelerating the achievement of this goal.

I do not claim that Poland should achieve the status of a regular NATO member immediately. On the contrary; I believe that this would be rather risky for us. It would be more advisable to employ appropriate procedures for gradually admitting new members to NATO—starting with the political sphere, then the sphere of defense planning, and finally, there would be full military integration for which our Army would then be well-prepared. If we joined this organization without proper preparations, the "old" members might consider us as a not fully credible partner; this would deprive us of equal influence on the shaping of the NATO policy. [passage omitted]

[Grochowski] What are we going to do, then, in order to ensure democratic control over the Army?

[Milewski] It is certainly not enough to merely declare it. Mechanisms must be created that will make it fully possible for the parliament, for the government, as well as for the president, who is the commander in chief of the Army, to bear real responsibility for the Army, which is written in the Small Constitution. In particular, the National Security Council must be given appropriate powers. It is also necessary to define unequivocally the degree and the kind of subordination of the command over the Polish Army to the civilian minister of national defense.

[Grochowski] In other words, this is an announcement of legislative changes.

[Milewski] Not only legislative, but also organizational changes and changes concerning internal regulations.

For a long time now we have been pointing to the need for legislative changes concerning not only the functioning of the Army, but also other elements of the state defense system. Among other things, we lack legislation on the Martial Law and we also need to thoroughly amend the law on the state of emergency. The old legal acts come from the period of the Martial Law—the early 1980's—and they are absolutely unfit to be applied today. They were supposed to make it possible for the authorities at the time to fight with the anticommunist political opposition; however, only to a very small degree do they create conditions to counter local conflicts near our borders or ecological threats, natural calamities, or mass influxes of immigrants. [passage omitted]

[Grochowski] Poland declares readiness for greater cooperation with the units of the NATO states during peacekeeping missions. Does this mean an increase in our involvement in these operations?

[Milewski] Currently, nearly 2,000 Polish officers and soldiers are participating in these missions abroad, half of them in former Yugoslavia. We would be prepared to carry out the request of the UN secretariat and increase these contingents; however, MON cannot afford this. Even though the UN reimburses the expenses for taking part in the missions, it does it after some time, which the secretariat justifies as Poland's overdue membership subscription fees.

[Grochowski] Still, we envision the establishment of a 1,000-person operational battalion, capable of a fast response.

[Milewski] It will be stationed in Poland and, if need be, it would be ready to take part in a NATO mission outside the country. We could prepare such a battalion within a year. The problem is that all of its members must be volunteers and must know at least basic English. These are rather difficult conditions; however, we hope that the experience that we gain will be able to be taken advantage of in the restructurization of other units. Eventually, the entire Army, as well as its various units and formations, should be able to act under international control within the framework of the joint forces of NATO. One of the conditions for achieving this goal is as follows: Our military commanders should denounce trends aimed at rendering the Polish Army structures more autonomous. [passage omitted]

Government Meeting in Lansk on Economic Program

LD0905212894 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] With the participation of Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak the government is holding its proceedings in Lansk. The main subject of the two-day meeting is a socioeconomic program for Poland for the next three years. Before flying to Lansk, the prime minister said: We have decided to hold this meeting out of town, so that everyday problems do not affect a calm exchange of views.

[Begin recording] [Pawlak] The purpose of this meeting, today and tomorrow, is to discuss the fundamental components of strategy for Poland. We want to do this in a peaceful atmosphere, so that everyday pressures do not interfere with our examination of these long-term processes. I think that, as a result of the circumstances and the situation, Poland has tremendous opportunities to become a country that counts and is significant in the east-central region of Europe, and we want to seek action opportunities that will make it possible to realize this objective.

[Correspondent Koziol] Mr. Prime Minister, will the current situation in the country, which is so heated, also be a subject of discussion at Lansk?

[Pawlak] We intend to focus on long-term issues. As far as immediate issues are concerned, as you very well know, ladies and gentlemen, Minister Miller and Minister Pol have been speaking about this. I think we should leave them room for maneuver here. [end recording]

Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy prime minister and finance minister, who accompanied the prime minister on his way to Lansk, emphasized the need to extend the perspective within which the government is going to pursue its economic policy. Often this perspective gets shortened under pressure from severe social problems, Grzegorz Kolodko added.

[Begin Kolodko recording] The Polish economy has good opportunities, and Polish society has good prospects, also as far as increased income is concerned. Admittedly we would like most of this income growth to be directed toward investment, with future generations, with the future in mind.

The main line of this strategy is stable growth, with a fairer division of the national income than hitherto, but this too requires some tidying up of the system, a continuation of work started earlier, and the establishment of some kind of sequence. That is why we would like to take some time thinking about this.

It is clear, of course, that we are not going to return from Lansk with some sort of final conception of government economic policy. In the immediate future its individual elements are going to be presented for public evaluation and for parliamentary debate. But we do have a conception of this kind and I would like to emphasize once again that the Polish economy has good prospects. [end recording]

Of the three scenarios for Polish economic development prepared by the Central Planning Office, the so-called fundamental scenario is going to be adopted. Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko:

[Begin Kolodko recording] Of course we have chosen the optimistic scenario, and through our program and our activities, together with other social and political forces, we want to implement the optimism which follows from this scenario. This scenario assumes a fairly significant national income growth, and this is going to require appropriate changes in the field of public finance and in the field of restructuring the economy, including property status changes, and its elements will gradually be implemented. This requires a tremendous legislative effort and, I repeat, peaceful and hard work, and sensible government policy. The government is open to criticism and is going to monitor and adjust this conception. [end recording]

Social Policy, Strike Discussed

WS1005102394 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 10 May 94 p 3

[Report by Jolanta Koral: "Government Concentrates; Ministers Debate in Lansk Forest"]

[Excerpt] *Labor Minister Leszek Miller presented the directions of social policy during yesterday's meeting of the government in Lansk.*

As we have learned unofficially, the government debated, among other topics, a reform of the labor law and collective labor agreements. Let us recall that a corrected version of the Labor Law Code was recently submitted to the Sejm by the government. The code is said to not regulate too many issues: the length of annual leaves, working conditions, and a maximum working time, among other things. The remaining issues would be settled through collective agreements signed between employers and employee representatives.

A draft law on collective agreements, which is part of the Agreement on State-Owned Enterprises, is to be debated by the Sejm very soon, as requested by the government. That was a demand put forward by "Solidarity" and by other trade unions which are negotiating over the "Solidarity" strike demands within the trilateral commission.

Tougher Position on Disability Pensions

The government most probably also debated reforms of social insurance. Work on the reforms has been proceeding without much vigor. Ministerial experts met to debate the issue as late as 27 April. The prime minister has announced that the direction of reforms will be announced in June.

Among other things, the government intends to tighten the criteria for awarding disability pensions, it also intends to reform maternity, sick, and family benefits, and to introduce a so-called social pension. Persons over 75 years of age would be entitled to this kind of pension, and they would also have to be illegible for a retirement or other kind of pension; the pension would also cover disabled individuals over the age of 18 who are completely incapable of working. Principles of awarding social rent as well as its size, are currently being negotiated within a government-trade union team (without the participation of "Solidarity.")

Beginning with 1995, a new system for deciding on disability would become effective, so as to avoid awarding disability pensions to young and healthy people. The new system would result in a 10-percent drop in the number of pensions being awarded.

Waging a War on Unemployment

The Central Planning Administration [CUP] has presented "Principles of Socioeconomic Policies for the 1994-97 Period." Among other things, those principles provide for the introduction of insurance against unemployment beginning in 1997. But employees would begin paying premiums as early as next year. The ratio would be as follows: Employers would pay two-thirds of the premium and employees—the remaining third.

For this year, CUP also predicts an increase in the level of salaries for budget sector employees by at least 1.5 percent, and also a 3.5-increase in retirement and other types of pensions.

CUP wants to extend Social Insurance Agency premiums to all income from work, including contracts for performance of specific items and order contracts. Currently, one does not have to pay premiums on order contracts signed for fewer than 30 days and on contracts for performance of a specific item.

According to CUP, the government's most important goals in the social area are, among other things, to decrease the unemployment rate among young people aged 19-24 (estimates are that in four years, it will increase by 412,000 people), and also increasing the number of jobs through a program to construct roads, telecommunication lines, and gas pipelines, as well as the development of low-income housing. Financial means for an active campaign against unemployment would increase by 22 percent by 1997 compared with 1993, and would amount to about 7.5 trillion zlotys.

Valorization and Inflation

CUP is in favor of changing the principles of valorization of retirement and other types of pensions, with the goal of making valorization follow price rises instead of the current system, where it shadows increases in average salaries. This would allow for the real value of benefits to be retained. A change in the principles of valorization is one of the strike demands put forward by "Solidarity." Other trade unions also support it.

Finally, during its session in the Warmie resort, the government will deal with protection of forests and a draft law on reprivatization and reimbursements. [passage omitted]

Government Relations With Mass Media Viewed

WS1005102594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 May 94 p 2

[Article by Eliza Olczyk: "Politicians Like To Be Silent; Escape From the Media"]

[Text] Political meetings closed to the press are an ordinary matter for politicians today. After a short period of general openness of the political life, which was, perhaps, only during the term of office of the "contract" Sejm, we saw a comeback to a secret life. There is usually one rule: The opposition meets and discusses matters openly, whereas the governing parties hold meetings behind closed doors.

The opposition which invites mass media to all its meetings, organizes press conferences, and shares information whenever journalists want it, stresses in this way that it has nothing to hide from the people. This attitude changes radically the moment the opposition becomes a governing party.

Through a Ladder to Lansk

It should be admitted that as far as avoiding journalists or giving evasive answers is concerned, the consecutive governing parties display inexhaustible invention.

After one of the meetings of the directorate (that is, the leadership of the present governing coalition) last autumn, journalists learned that the politicians discussed... potato harvesting.

After submitting his resignation from the post of deputy prime minister and finance minister, Marek Borowski entrenched himself in his office and it was difficult to "squeeze" a word of comment out of him.

The ladder that Democratic Left Alliance leader Aleksander Kwasniewski used to leave the Sejm premises will probably go down in the history of the Polish parliamentary system.

Recently sessions of politicians held outside Warsaw have been very popular. In a forest it is much easier to hide from journalists and all information reach the media with considerable delay. It is difficult to say what purpose this is supposed to serve—the information reaches the media sooner or later anyway.

Perhaps it is the spring that makes the politicians seek refuge from the media outside Warsaw. Last Friday in Jablonna there was a meeting of the National Council of Radio and Television and the leadership of the Polish Television (participating in the meeting was, among other persons, Wieslaw Walendziak, the Supervisory Board of the Polish Television and the Board of Directors, the directors of the First and the Second Program, as well as the heads of the regional sections). Invited to the meeting was also Government Press Office Head Dariusz Jadowski and President's Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski (the latter did not arrive). The meeting was, needless to say, closed to the press, even though it was devoted to the activities of a component of the mass media—the television.

The government decided to hold a session of the Council of Ministers in Lansk. The government building is hidden in a forest near a beautiful lake. It is separated from the nearest village by kilometers of forests. Behind the doors there are no crowds of journalists demanding immediate answers to thousands of inquisitive questions.

The Government Point of View

Freedom of speech and openness of the political life are undoubtedly cumbersome to the participants of this life. The openness of the political life is desirable for those who do not participate in it, and it serves the purpose of calling those who are governing the country at the moment to account. Those who are in power do not like to be called to account. They are not very favorably disposed toward independent press, because it discusses issues that they would willingly conceal. The existence of the free press forces the subordinated press to be objective—it cannot omit important information because it would lose its readers. Therefore, subordination of the entire press is a desired state of affairs for all those who are in power. Since this state of affairs is not easy to accomplish, politicians are hiding.

They say that playing politics far from people's eyes is quite common also in countries with rooted democracies. No one is surprised by the fact that government spokesmen refuse to make any comments. Western parliaments are not visited by large groups of journalists, as is the case in our Sejm.

On the other hand, however, in deeply rooted democracies no one accuses the press of speculating, being aggressive and nonobjective, and of pursuing sensational news only, instead of showing positive models and printing official communiques when they are issued.

New Internal Affairs Deputy Minister Interviewed

WS0605133394 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 6 May 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Internal Affairs Deputy Minister Zbigniew Sobotka by Aleksander Frydrychowski; place and date not given: "Promotion Means Joint Responsibility"]

[Excerpt] [Frydrychowicz] First of all congratulations on your appointment. What will you deal with in the ministry?

[Sobotka] I do not know the specific scope of my powers yet. They are supposed to be defined at a joint session of the leadership of the ministry, after Minister Milczanowski returns to Warsaw—that is, next week.

I know from earlier decisions that my duties will include contacts with the parliament, legislation, and perhaps

issues related to the budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. What else—we will see.

[Frydrychowicz] You are the first deputy minister of internal affairs appointed on the basis of the coalition's "system." I remember Minister Milczanowski saying that he would like to appoint a competent person to this post. You are not a lawyer; you never worked in the ministry. What, then, are your qualifications?

[Sobotka] I was quite familiar with the ministry when I was a deputy—it is my third term in office. I now, as well as previously, work in the Sejm Administration and on the Internal Affairs Committee. All the problems of MSW are focussed.

I was also a member of the Political Advisory Committee of the minister of internal affairs.

Important is also the fact that I served in the MSW Vistula Units.

The problems that I will tackle at the ministry will not be of a strictly legal nature; my experience will certainly come in handy in the ministry. I suppose that this is what Minister Milczanowski took into consideration when he chose me as a candidate for the post of deputy minister.

[Frydrychowicz] What will your tasks be in the ministry—as a person sent there by the coalition, or, actually, by only one part of it?

[Sobotka] I certainly have not come to MSW to watch over the ministry's head, which various people, unfavorably disposed toward me, have been trying to imply for some time. The scope of MSW activities is regulated by law. I will simply be one of Minister Milczanowski's deputies.

Thus, I have not come to the ministry with special demands; I have come here to jointly steer it. The point is not to shape a separate policy of the ministry, but to participate in managing it and to bear joint responsibility for the fulfillment of tasks.

[Frydrychowicz] Mass media stresses the fact that you were a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party [PZPR]. Will this experience be an obstacle for you in the fulfillment of the present function?

[Sobotka] It will certainly not be an obstacle. There is nothing that I should be ashamed of in that period. The fact that in the final period of the functioning of PZPR I was a member of its leadership only enriched my experience in management. The fact that I participated in the work of the "round table," that is, in the activities that made it possible for Poles to reach agreement, is also quite significant.

I suppose that I have often proved that I can quietly discuss the most difficult problems and resolve them. Therefore, I treat my experience gained in PZPR and later in its leadership as useful in my fulfillment of the present state functions. [passage omitted]

Japan Resumes Short-Term Credit Guarantees

LD0705132594 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 7 May 94

[Text] Eijiro Hata, Japanese minister of international trade and industry, who met with Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko today, announced the resumption of short-term credit guarantees for Poland. Minister Hata said that prompt servicing of the Polish foreign debt is a condition for the further improvement of financial relations with Japan.

During the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko and Minister Hata discussed the latest plans by Japanese firms to invest in Poland, the problems of bilateral trade exchange, and Japanese technical aid for Poland.

Pros, Cons of Draft Reprivatization Law Viewed

WS0905132894 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7-8 May 94 p 24

[Article by Marek Wielgo: "Coupon Reprivatization"]

[Text] *The Ministry of Ownership Transformation [MPW] offers securities to those whose property was nationalized illegally in the 1940's and 1950's, not a return of the property.*

Yesterday [6 May], the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers [KERM] debated the draft law; KERM is then to send its remarks over to MPW. A preliminary version of the draft law which will take KERM's remarks into account, will most probably be announced on Tuesday [10 May]. It is quite possible that a first reading of the governmental draft reprivatization law and the already prepared draft coming from Sejm deputies, will take place in the Sejm at the end of May and the beginning of June.

A Limited Reprivatization

MPW wants reprivatization to include not all those who have claims but only those whose property was taken away from them illegally in the 1944-58 period, as well as all those who have still not received the reimbursements they had been promised. Those former owners who have already received some form of benefit—even if the benefit does not equal the value of the property lost—would not be entitled to reimbursements.

The current residence of persons applying for reimbursements, would be irrelevant. Anybody who at the time of nationalization had Polish citizenship and has not lost it up to now, could apply for reimbursements. So reprivatization would also cover persons of dual citizenship. The issue of heirs to those whose property was nationalized, has not been settled yet.

According to preliminary estimates, reimbursements would be paid exclusively in the form of reprivatization coupons (this would also apply to former owners of Warsaw-area land).

But former owners would not get as much as experts would assess their losses to have been. For instance, if the value of the property taken away from an owner does not exceed 1 billion of today's zlotys, then the former owner would receive 1 billion zlotys in coupons. Former owners of property which was worth more than 1 billion would not receive the property's value in coupons. They would get 1 billion plus some part of what remains above that amount.

One would be able to introduce these reprivatization coupons (which should actually be called reimbursement coupons) into circulation for a period of up to 10 years. In order to retain the coupons' real value, they would be valorized by an indicator of investment price increases (there is preliminary talk of about 10 percent per year).

Therefore, an owner of such coupons could sell them for cash, could buy with them real estate put up for auction by gminas [small administrative units] and by the State Treasury, or exchange them for shares of enterprises being privatized.

Former owners would receive the right of preemption of their old real estate being sold by the State Treasury or by a gmina.

Ownership Transformation Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek stated yesterday that he is opposed to holding a referendum in which all citizens would speak out on whom to return property to, and how much of it (the government is also considering such a possibility).

An Unlimited Reprivatization

Another draft reprivatization law has been sitting in the Sejm for six months now. It was prepared jointly by MPW and associations comprising former owners in the summer of 1993 (when there was no Sejm). The draft law found its way into the current Sejm as an initiative by Sejm deputies from virtually all deputies clubs.

Among other things, the draft law envisages a very comprehensive reprivatization (without the restrictions suggested by the government). In those cases where it is possible, property would be returned either in its natural form or in the form of a so-called unwanted property which means for instance waste land. Reprivatization coupons would be handed out as a last resort.

The law would not conflict with the interests of "third persons who acquired nationalized property in good faith" (for instance farmers who received land as a result of agrarian reforms, or factories established on the basis of nationalized plants).

Owners Protest

A reprivatization council at MPW demands reimbursements in a natural form. According to Krzysztof Laszkiewicz, the council's chief, 2.5 million hectares of land is not being cultivated whereas there are some former owners who could utilize the land. Yesterday, the council expressed sharp criticism of the governmental initiative, and announced that the former owners will protest and will file a law suit over the governmental draft with international institutions designed to watch over observance of human rights, among them the UN and the Helsinki Committee.

Salary Control Legislation Examined

WS0605133294 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 6-8 May 94 p 1

[Report by "E.W.:" "Popiwek Until Year's End? Senate Adopted a Law on Regulation of Salaries"]

[Text] *On 5 May the Senate adopted a neopopiwek [tax on excessive wage increases] law, with 51 votes in favor, 14 against, and eight abstentions. In the only amendment submitted, the senators made the reservation that the law approved by them is to be in force until the end of the year. The document will go back to the Sejm, which must debate the amendment, and then it will wait for the president's signature. The law can become effective on the first day of the month following the month in which the law is announced.*

The senators rejected a motion by Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski of "Solidarity" to completely reject the law, and they decided to refuse to accept an amendment submitted by Senator Piotr Andrzejewski which would have limited the law's scope to independent shaping of salaries by all economic units.

The law (similar to an earlier governmental document) provides that those enterprises that exceed the allowed salary limit will be penalized by a so-called sanction payment, which will be 1.5 zlotys for each zloty paid out above the norm. The payments will be directed to the state budget, with enterprises which send at least part of their production abroad, being given breaks. The law covers all state-owned and communal enterprises, state-owned banks, and companies where the State Treasury has no less than 80 percent of the shares. On the other hand, popiwek does not cover private enterprises or banks, firms with participation of foreign capital, or cultural institutions and convalescent homes.

Based on the law, enterprises will be able to select one of the following four methods of shaping salaries: a managerial contract, an agreement with a local State Treasury Chamber, a limit dependent on the previous year's profit-salary ratio in the enterprise, or salaries determined by a trilateral commission.

Melescanu Welcomes Associate Membership in WEU

AU1005100494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 10 May 94

[Text] Romania, together with eight other Central and Eastern European countries, yesterday became an associate member of the Western European Union [WEU]. In accordance with the new statute, which is included in the political document adopted at the meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Union that took place in Luxembourg, these nine associate members will regularly participate in the meetings of the Council, will be able to attend meetings of certain working groups of the organization, and will have a permanent connection with the central planning body of the WEU in Brussels.

Similarly, according to reports by our correspondent Andrei Barsan, the countries in Central Europe will be able to participate in peacekeeping operations or military activities initiated by the WEU.

Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, who attended the meeting together with Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca, stressed the importance of yesterday's decision, noting that it is the first time that an established security structure in Western Europe is opening up to other countries as well.

Similarly, Melescanu said that for Romania the act of becoming an associate member of the WEU—that is, the armed wing of the European Union and at the same time the European pillar of NATO—reflects the steady efforts of the Romanian Government to achieve integration into all European structures and recognition of the path traveled by our country, as our country has recuperated certain arrears in a spectacular way compared with other countries in the region as far as integration is concerned.

Melescanu, Germany's Spranger Sign Accord

AU0605123994 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 6 May 94

[Text] During the talks between Carl-Dieter Spranger, German minister for economic cooperation, who is paying a visit to our country at the invitation of the Romanian Government, and Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu, the sides approached aspects of the current stage of bilateral relations with emphasis on the support that Germany is ready to grant to accelerate the reform processes in Romania.

The Romanian side stressed the importance it attaches to developing privileged relations with Germany and showed gratitude for the support that this country granted Romania within the European Union and the G-24 in financial and economic areas, as well as for the support granted to German ethnic communities in Romania.

According to information from our correspondent Doina Saiciuc, the German guest stressed that the governmental framework accord on technical cooperation between Romania and Germany that he will sign with Romanian Minister of Finance Florin Georgescu is the first of this kind with a country in Central and Eastern Europe. One wishes to intensify the support granted by Germany to Romania to enable Romania to overcome the difficulties of transition and accelerate the passage to the market economy.

Spranger conveyed the German Government's wish to intensify cooperation with Romania in various areas and remarked on the increasing importance that the German Government grants to relations with our country. The guest referred to the visits that the German minister of defense and the federal foreign minister plan to make to Bucharest in the near future.

In connection with some opinions that have been circulated lately which reintroduce the idea of differentiation of treatment applied to associated states in Central Europe and which imply discrimination against Romania, the German minister mentioned that the integration into the European Union of associated countries should take into account economic performance criteria and not criteria regarding their association with one group or another.

In a statement after his talks with the Romanian foreign minister, Spranger stated that his visit to Romania is an expression of the importance that Germany gives to relations with our country and of the wish to further expand these relations. Referring to the visit he is going to make to projects achieved within the framework of Romanian-German cooperation program in Sibiu and Arad, where he will hold talks with representatives of the local authorities and of the German minority, Spranger noted that discussions will not focus only on German minority issues but will also take into account the interests of Romania in general.

A short while ago our correspondent accredited to the government informed us that a technical cooperation accord was signed at Victoria Palace between the Romanian and German Governments. The accord establishes the unfolding of nonrefundable economic assistance granted by Germany to our country. The volume of this assistance is about 250 million German marks. The document was signed by Spranger and Mircea Cosea, minister of state and chairman of the Council for Coordination, Strategy, and Economic Reform.

Iliescu Views Discrimination Against Germans

AU0605140394 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 May 94 p 4

["ul" report: "Iliescu: Discriminatory Measures Against Romanian Germans"]

[Text] Bucharest, 5 May—Romanian President Iliescu has admitted that the German minority in Romania was subjected to "discriminatory measures" in the years of communism. However, in talking to this newspaper he chose a formulation that does not correspond to what the leadership of the "Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania" (DFDR) expects of him. Iliescu said that there were "delicate moments" in Romania after World War II. Germans

and Romania got into "difficulties" at that time. Many were deported or expropriated. The current Romanian leadership rejects "these discriminatory measures." Iliescu added that, since the end of the dictatorship, Germans are no longer being discriminated in Romania. The current difficulties of the country are general and affect all nationalities. Anyone who emigrates today does that mainly for material reasons and not because Germans are discriminated against in Romania. In Romania politicians of both the parties close to the government and the opposition keep repeating how much the country regrets the emigration of the German minority.

DFDR Chairman Philippi called Iliescu's comments on the deportations and expropriations of the postwar period "too general." According to him, Romanian Germans can regain trust in their state only if, apart from the injustices under which all citizens suffered, Iliescu also recognizes those that were imposed on the Germans in particular. Philippi says he expects Iliescu to "solemnly" recognize the excesses of the state against the German ethnic group—similar to what Czech President Havel did in the past. In January 1945, about 70,000 Romanian Germans were arrested by Romanian police and Romanian military and extradited to the Soviet Union for years of forced labor. More than 10,000 died during the transports and in the Soviet labor camps. The Romanian Germans also accuse the Romanian state of having carried out general expropriations at the beginning of the communist dictatorship, which hit the German minority particularly hard.

Germany supports the demand of the DFDR that Romania should officially recognize the discrimination. Horst Waffenschmidt (Christian Democratic Union), parliamentary state secretary in the Interior Ministry and the Federal Government's commissioner for resettlers, who is currently visiting the Romanian capital and the most important settlement areas of the Romanian Germans, broached the desire for an official statement during a meeting with Iliescu in the president's palace of Cotroceni in Bucharest. After the meeting Iliescu commented on this by saying that the desires of the Romanian Germans exclusively affect the relationship of the Romanian state with its citizens.

Waffenschmidt pointed out to Iliescu that Germany has spent more than 111 million German marks [DM] since 1990 to help the Germans in Romania. In 1994, another DM11 million are supposed to be spent for this purpose. This help also benefits the "neighboring surroundings" of the Germans in Romania. The Federal Government wants to contribute to having Germans and Romanians coexist peacefully. However, it is expected that Romania abolish the customs duties that are currently levied on German relief supplies. In addition, television must transmit more German broadcasts. After the meeting, Iliescu announced that the Romanian Government will reexamine the customs regulations.

Timisoara Mayor Protests Treatment of Ex-King

AU0605125594 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 30 Apr 94 p 3

["Protest" signed by Timisoara Mayor Viorel Oancea]

[Text] In connection with the invitation to Their Majesties King Mihai I and Queen Ana to spend the Holy Easter Holidays together with Timisoara citizens, we wish to make public our protest at the Government's attitude, which lacks all respect for the martyr-town Timisoara and its legally established authorities.

Striking again at the dignity of the legally elected local authorities and violating once again the laws of this country's Parliament—above all the law on local administration, according to which the local authority is invested with autonomy in decision-making and local representation of the state institutions—the Romanian Government, by dragging out the issue and setting almost absurd conditions for granting an entry visa to His Majesty King Mihai I as a private person, has not only expressed a position full of contempt for the monarchic institutions but also violated one of the main rights of every citizen, namely the right to visit his own country. The major reason for of this unqualifiable attitude is the current leadership's legitimacy complex.

This is new proof that Timisoara, the symbol of democracy and of a civilized attitude toward the world and its development, represents for those in power a source of fear, an area that generates anxiety compared with the sweet comfort of their own position.

Dear Timisoara citizens, they have not forgiven us for the fact that the wave that overthrew the entire order to which the current leaders are still devoted started here.

We do not wish to damage the status of this town, and so we defy this attitude of the government that is detrimental to Timisoara's reputation!

Expressing my deepest regret at the government's attitude and convinced that their Majesties Mihai I and Queen Ana will not extend their sorrow at this reaction of frightful reserve to us, I nurture the hope that the time will come when the bells of the Metropolitan Cathedral in Timisoara will chime to welcome its founder, Mihai I of Romania.

God bless us all!

Viorel Oancea, mayor of Timisoara

Customs Service Official Resigns; Dispute Noted

AU0905174794 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 5 May 94 p 9

[Report by Vlad Pufu: "General Suceava Resigned From the Customs Directorate"]

[Text] Sources at the Ministry of Finance have revealed to our reporters that on 29 April Reserve General Ioan

Suceava stepped down from his office as deputy general director of the General Customs Directorate and chief of the Directorate for Customs Checking and Supervision.

In his resignation, which was addressed to Finance Minister Florin Georgescu, General Suceava requested "the termination of my employment beginning 15 April, on the basis of Article 29."

The recent conflict that broke out between the Ministry of Interior and the General Customs Directorate is gaining momentum. On 25 April Mihai Panzariu, general director of the General Customs Directorate, advised General Suceava that he should hand in his resignation before 1 May, our sources said.

"Mihai Panzariu has begun to purge his backyard of spies. As you may know, the relations between the two were not exactly amiable. It seems that now they managed to reveal some irregularities by General Suceava, so that they could offer him this solution as a more elegant way to leave his office," the same sources asserted.

Muslim-Croatian Talks Continue in Vienna

AU1005103594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 10 May 94

[Report by Amir Hodzic from Vienna]

[Text] The talks between the delegations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are continuing in Vienna today on the implementation of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Details concerning the borders of the Herzegovina cantons are to be worked out today. Last night our delegation put forward several proposals as to possible solutions, after which the Croatian delegation asked for a break in order to conduct additional consultations. Even though these are delicate matters, the delegations are expected to complete this part of the job today, and then approach the agreement concerning the package, which includes the number and borders of the cantons, and the distribution of the ministerial positions in the government and the functions in the federation.

Zagreb Radio Roundup

LD0905210194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] The third day of negotiations on the implementation of the Washington agreement between the Croats and Bosniaks ended at the U.S. Embassy with the exchange of maps. Tihomir Vinkovic reports from Vienna:

[Vinkovic] The negotiations lasted a long time, and some progress was made after all. The questions of external borders with the Serbs, and of the leaderhip of the federation and the government have been been resolved in principle. The question that remains to be resolved is the number of the cantons in the federation and their borders. The maps were drafted and exchanged at the end of today's round of talks. The delegation of the Bosnian Croats, led by Kresimir Zubak, exchanged the delineation maps with the Bosniak delegation, led by Haris Silajdzic.

The contentious areas are central Bosnia and the municipalities of Mostar and Stolac. The positions on central Bosnia have converged, Kresimir Zubak said. But is this enough to reach an agreement?

The part of the negotiations dealing with the relations between the Bosniak-Croat federation and the Republic of Croatia passed without difficulties. Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic took part in it.

The only certain thing is that the negotiations will continue tomorrow.

Muslims, Croats Disagree on Borders

AU0905185994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] Bosniak and Croatian delegations have continued talks in Vienna on the implementation of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most attention today was devoted to the borders between cantons and the number of cantons within the federation. Our special correspondent, Amir Hodzic, reports from Vienna:

[Begin Hodzic recording] Stands have so far been coordinated on the canton of Foca with a majority Croatian population and [word indistinct] of two cantons in central Bosnia and the Lasva Valley. There have been a few disputes about the status of Gornji Vakuf, that is, individual districts in the outskirts of the commune's territory. Views about the cantonal setup of Herzegovina are somewhat different. Our delegation is of the opinion that the commune of Stolac with (?Dubrava) Plateau and the region along the left side of the Neretva River should be a canton with the Bosniak-Muslim majority population because it has an absolute majority of 55 percent of Bosniak people. For this reason, as well as for the reasons of tradition, geography, economy, communications, and other reasons it should be a special cantonal entity.

The Croatian delegation, however, offers one canton that would have an ethnic [word indistinct] with a majority Croatian population, its borders would be drawn at the foot of the Jablanica Mountain, along the Neretva Valley, and it would encompass the whole of the Stolac Commune. As a major, principled question is involved here, participants in the talks will focus their attention on it in the afternoon as well so that a realistic agreement can be reached at the end. [end recording]

Issue Unresolved

LD0905142194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 May 94

[Report by Tihomir Vinkovic from Vienna]

[Excerpt] Muslim-Croat talks on the implementation of the Washington agreement resumed today. Croats and Bosniaks discussed canton borders of the Federation, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said at the end of this morning's round of talks. The maps are still in front of the negotiators. Where is the solution? I think that we made an important step forward and our standpoints on central Bosnia are converging, Kresimir Zubak, the head of the Croat delegation from Bosnia-Herzegovina said, adding that the delegations are continuing to present their views on Herzegovina, and that the process of harmonization continues. It seems that the main reason why no agreement has yet been reached are the internal cantonal borders of the Bosniak-Croat Federation. [passage omitted]

'Loyalist' Serbs Demand Role in Peace Talks

AU1005095294 Paris AFP in English 0446 GMT 10 May 94

[By Bernard Besserglik]

[Text] Sarajevo, May 10 (AFP)—Bosnia's loyalist Serbs begin a series of meetings in foreign capitals Wednesday to demand a role in peace talks on an equal footing with the separatist Serbs of Radovan Karadzic. A delegation invited to Moscow will argue before the Duma that the Serb Civic Council, which supports Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, has as much right to represent Bosnia's Serb community as the self-proclaimed Serb republic based in Pale, the council's leader, Mirko Pejanovic, told AFP.

Delegates will visit Paris later in the month and have also been invited to Washington and the European Community in Brussels, he said. The reluctance so far of foreign governments to recognise the representativeness of the loyalist Serb leadership is a serious mistake, Pejanovic believed, pointing out that the number of Serbs in the territory controlled by Pale is under half the total of 1.3 million who lived in the pre-war republic. Of the 400,000 Bosnian Serbs who fled the fighting that broke out two years ago to Serbia and Montenegro and the 100,000 in Europe, the great majority support the loyalist position, he said.

Pejanovic, a member of Bosnia's collective presidency, claimed the moral high ground with the argument that since loyalist Serbs shared the suffering of the Moslems and Croats during the bombardment of Sarajevo by the Pale forces, they represent a unique force for reconciliation. "We are a moral and peace factor because we are for a multicultural society with equal rights for all groups and seek a negotiated and political solution. Karadzic has ruled out a multicultural society, and offers only more war," he said.

The Civic Council was elected by a consultative assembly in late March to represent the 200,000 loyalist Serbs in Bosnia, of whom around 60,000 live in Sarajevo.

"We believe that in order to act (in the Bosnian conflict), the international community must include the loyal Serbs," Pejanovic said. "We don't want to represent the Karadzic Serbs, we don't want to represent criminals. But we cannot accept that he with his lies represents us."

While Pejanovic and other Civil Council leaders dispute the legitimacy they believe foreign governments are abusively attributing to the Serbs in Pale, the loyalties of the Serbs in both camps are hard to assess. Those who remained in government-controlled territory did so for a variety of reasons, in which regard for legality and the democratic process may have been stronger than any firm commitment to the govermnment that emerged from parliamentary elections in 1991.

"Loyalist Serbs need not be regarded as pro-government," presidential advisor Kemal Muftic said. "They are pro-Bosnian and patriotic. Governments come and go." The loyalties of individual Serbs have been tested as the conflict has developed. They have been regarded by some as a potential fifth column—there were attacks on Serbs during the early stages of the war—and have themselves looked with growing unease on signs of increasing Islamic sensibility in some government ministries.

A number of Serbs, difficult to quantify, are tempted to leave if only because of the immense physical devastation inflicted on this city and the general hardship. The same could be said of many Moslems and Croats. The morale of Serbs in Pale-controlled territory is said by reporters who have visited the provinces to be flagging, and Civic Council secretary Gavrlo Grahovac said he had received secret messages of support from such separatist strongholds as Banja Luka and Trebinje.

"Karadzic's power is not greater than ours," he said. "It's just that he has more weapons."

Grahovac, a publisher, said he and his wife had been wary during the early stages of the conflict. "Some people were killed on the street just because they were Serbs." But the antipathy of non-Serbs had been "very little, compared with what the Karadzic Serbs did." He spoke of the "shame of many" in the Serb community at the actions of the separatists, and looked back with fondness at the days when "there were no Serbs, or Moslems, or Croats, only Yugoslavs."

UNPROFOR Unable To Locate Missing Serb Tank

AU0905113594 Paris AFP in English 1109 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] Sarajevo, May 9 (AFP)—UN forces in the Bosnian capital have failed to locate a Bosnian Serb tank secreted in a Sarajevo suburb since late Friday, UN Protection Force spokesman Eric Chaperon said here Monday. UN military observers continued to patrol the Grbavica sector, and if the tank was found UNPROFOR would go and fetch it, Major Chaperon said. Another UN officer noted the Serbs were letting very few military observers into the area.

The tank, probably a T-34, disappeared late on Friday while being transported on a truck from Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale in violation of the 20-kilometre (12.5-mile) exclusion zone ordered by NATO to bar heavy weaponry around Sarajevo. Chaperon reported rising tension at Mostar in the south, and some mortar fire at Celic and Visoko in the north-east. He said several dozen armed Serb militiamen were still in position on the right bank of the river Drina in the Moslem enclave of Gorazde, in defiance of an exclusion zone order.

UN Says Bosnian Army Violating Exclusion Zone

AU1005115894 Paris AFP in English 0955 GMT 10 May 94

[Text] Sarajevo, May 10 (AFP)—The Bosnian Government Army has deployed mortars and anti-aircraft guns near Sarajevo in violation of the heavy arms exclusion zone around the city, UN officials said Tuesday [10 May]. UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) spokesman Eric Chaperon said the Moslem-led forces had heavy weapons and many patrols on Mount Igman, to the west of the city, facing Bosnian Serb lines within the 20-kilometre (12.5-mile) exclusion zone ordered by NATO in February under the threat of air strikes.

Another UNPROFOR officer, speaking anonymously, said helicopter patrols had on Monday counted four mortars and two anti-aircraft guns deployed alongside 1,000 Bosnian army troops around Mount Igman, a strategic height overlooking the Bosnian capital. Chaperon also reported fresh fighting between Bosnian troops loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic and soldiers following orders of Fikret Abdic, the renegade Moslem leader of the northwestern Bosnian pocket of Bihac.

UNHCR Asks Croats To Lift Limits on Convoys

AU0905161794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] The State Committee of Bosnia-Herzegovina for Relations with the United Nations warns of a very serious problem regarding the passage of humanitarian convoys on the road leading from the Dalmatian coast toward central Bosnia and Sarajevo. What is involved is the measure taken by the Ministry of Traffic and Communications and the (?Roads) Public Enterprise of the so-called Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosna that—in conformity with the conclusion made by the government of the so-called Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosna on 5 April—limits the passage of vehicles of a certain weight along the said road, introduces a road toll, and limits the travelling time and speed.

These restrictions make it completely impossible for the UNHCR and its partners to continue supplying central Bosnia and Sarajevo with food and other kinds of aid. According to the Information Ministry of Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Karen Kong abu-Zaid), head of the UNHCR mission of Bosnia, informed Dr. Hasan Muratovic, chairman of the State Committee of Bosnia-Herzegovina for Relations with United Nations, about this problem and asked him for all available measures to be taken with a view to lifting the said restrictions and enabling normal supplies.

Akashi on 'Firm Attitude' Toward Serbs, UN Role

BR0905112494 Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 May 94 p 4

[Interview with Yasushi Akashi, UN special envoy in Bosnia, by Isabelle Lasserre in Zagreb; date not given: "Akashi: The United Nations Cannot Impose Itself in Bosnia"]

[Text] [Lasserre] Did you think when you left Cambodia that your mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina would be so difficult?

[Akashi] Yes, and I had no illusions. In peace-keeping operations, there are no easy missions and each one is unique. It requires patience, obstinacy, and flexibility. The record in the former Yugoslavia is fairly positive. Problems remain, but I can see light at the end of the tunnel.

[Lasserre] You are accused of being conciliatory toward the Bosnian Serbs. What is your answer?

[Akashi] People think that the United Nations can impose its will on the warring sides. That is not true. Moreover, the sad fate of negotiators is that they are not able to choose those with whom they negotiate, or to display their preferences. We have spent the most time with the Serbs, and we have shown an extremely firm attitude. We can be proud of what we have done.

[Lasserre] Why did you refuse to use force in Gorazde?

[Akashi] The threat of air strikes was enough and very useful to the negotiations. We succeeded without having to use force.

[Lasserre] Do you not have the impression of being used by the Serbs and serving their interests?

[Akashi] Not at all. The United Nations has its own viewpoint. We are the bridge across which the different sides continue to talk. It would be the end of the UN mission if it were seen as a participant in this war.

[Lasserre] What do you think of Radovan Karadzic? Do you regard him as a man of peace?

[Akashi] You will read that in my memoirs... The leaders with whom I am negotiating represent their populations. I make no difference between them. I try to be as objective and impartial as possible.

[Lasserre] You have been strongly criticized. The Bosnian Government has called for your resignation. Are you affected by that?

[Akashi] Not much. I am calm and not very sensitive to pressure. The UN secretary general has expressed his complete confidence in me. I have enough strength not to listen to rumors, most especially those coming from people who know nothing of the situation. It is easy to simplify matters. But the real situation is never black or white, but somewhere between the two, in a gray area.

[Lasserre] So, you do not question your method, i.e., negotiation, and its limits?

[Akashi] No. Why always be so pessimistic and overdramatize things? We must fight against the simplistic solutions demanded by impatient people. Negotiations must be carried out with everybody and must succeed in the long term. The Serbs are not unmoved by our arguments.

[Lasserre] Will the United Nations emerge unchanged from the former Yugoslavia?

[Akashi] If we succeed, the United Nations will emerge from here stronger than before. If we fail, it will suffer a setback from which it will be difficult to recover for 10 years. But peace here cannot be built without the United Nations. Here, we sometimes show signs of weakness, but we are indispensible. In the final analysis, it is the aspirations of the peoples of Bosnia which will determine our success or failure.

[Lasserre] Has your action in Cambodia and then in the former Yugoslavia served Japan and its ambition to join the UN Security Council?

[Akashi] I have not served Japanese interests and I am embarrassed by my country's timidity. I have urged my political friends to send troops to the former Yugoslavia. I criticize them for not having done so yet. If my work one day makes it possible to arouse more active participation in the peacekeeping operations, I will be happy.

Abdic 'Mercenaries' Attack in Bihac Region

LD0905213194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 9 May 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic]

[Text] Today, the joint aggressors stepped up their attacks on the Bihac region [words indistinct]. As regards their furious assaults, the initiative was taken by the members of the treacherous Kladusa paramilitaries [Fikret Abdic's forces], who in the early hours of this morning started pounding the demarcation lines with all their artillery and other weapons. There were also very heavy attacks in Cazin's border areas [words indistinct].

In addition to this they are trying to infiltrate commando groups. The attacks are being spearheaded by gangs of hardened criminals and mercenaries who leave devastation in their wake. There is a considerable number of casualties, fatalities, and seriously wounded people, in the wake of today's murderous attacks. Abdic's mercenaries continue to launch artillery attacks in other areas. [passage indistinct]

Croat-Muslim Spring Offensive Plans

94BA0260A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 94 p 12

[Article by Radovan Kovacevic: "Continuation of the Muslim Spring Offensive"]

[Text] "We will go for all or nothing," Alija Izetbegovic declared yesterday in Sarajevo at a rally in support of Gorazde. He added at the same time the characteristic explanation for this key thesis of his: "Only strength is respected in this world."

It is easiest to explain his violent anger in terms of the military defeat in the Drina Valley, where an entire corps of his suffered defeat. An analysis of reports from the battlefield these days nevertheless suggests some serious assessments.

Four days ago, that is, Colonel General Ante Roso, commander of the General Staff of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], declared in central Bosnia that "the war is not over yet." And immediately thereafter, along with General Rasim Delic, his counterpart in the Muslim armed forces [MOS], he went on an inspection of his units in the area of Zenica, Zavidovici, and northward all the way to Gradacac.

The Actions of the Bosnian Muslims

Actions like these on the part of the commanders have become routine since the Washington agreement. Their purpose, it is judged in the staffs of the army of the Srpska republic [RS], is to coordinate the armed actions of the Muslims and Croats.

Confirmation of this has arrived from Zagreb, where a meeting of the General Staff of the Croatian Army [HV] was held recently; mobilization of Croatian and Muslim refugees from Bosnia who have taken shelter in Croatian cities began soon afterward. The 112th HVO Brigade has just been formed from former inhabitants of Travnik, Vitez, and Busovaca. An immense number of them undoubtedly still remember how in the spring of last year they had to flee to Vlasic in the face of the Muslim offensive in the Lasva Valley, and emergency assistance was offered to them by units of the army of the RS....

Allies, however, are highly perishable goods in this war. Following the merciless showdown between the Muslims and Croats, which lasted more than a year, a combined brigade of the HVO has been sent to the area of Usora, Zepce, and Zavidovici.

Continuation of the spring offensive is being mentioned in the staffs more and more frequently. Gorazde, according to many, including even Gen. Michael Rose, was a focal point of limited tactical importance. Aside from what we have mentioned, the following details indicate the strategic objectives of the Croatian-Muslim coalition. The level of combat readiness of the HV, especially the artillery and engineers, has been upgraded in Slavonski Brod, Slavonski Samac, Orasje, and Zupanja. Six hundred soldiers who have arrived from the area of Rijeka have also been deployed there. Is it perhaps because as better swimmers they are to swim across the Sava as part of a future beachhead operation?

Ambitions and Appetites

Five days ago, POLITIKA published the observation of the defense command of Majevica that no fewer than 28 brigades of the MOS had built up in the Tuzla region. The news is similar from Kupres: HVO troops are arriving from the direction of Livno, Duvno, and Sujica.

The offensive campaign is certain, and in many assessments the main strike of the Muslim force could be

directed at Brcko, where there would be combined action with Croatian troops. Yesterday's artillery-infantry attacks on Serbian positions in Brka, which is 9 km from Brcko, along with a number of similar ones, probably represent only a "feeling" of the enemy pulse.

Around Ozren it is no longer a question of that, but of incessant fierce attacks. Thus the command of the tactical group of brigades there had to issue a sharp warning to the Muslim authorities in Banovici, Lukavac, Gracanica, and Tuzla that it would "take countermeasures" unless they calmed down.

The situation is similar in Doboj and Teslic. The shelling of these Serbian cities has gone on for more than two years with brief intervals.

The Muslim army, it is acknowledged in Serbian staffs, is considerably better-organized than a few months ago, and its ambitions (in accordance with the territorial appetites of the top Izetbegovic leadership) are growing. The lack of armament and especially artillery ammunition is already being overcome regardless of the well-known embargo. They are using Croatian seaports on the Adriatic for imports from Turkey and the Arab countries. Numerical superiority and considerable improvement of maneuverability are a challenge difficult to resist....

The response to all this in the high-level circles of the army of the RS is that the situation is under control, that is, that the Serbian forces are adequate along all the lines of possible offensive strikes, which is one of the ways of shortening the length of the war. The more reasonable option is that of negotiation, but it still seems far away from this kind of Bosnia.

Tudjman on Bosnian Talks, Kuna, HDZ Split

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[News conference by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman with foreign and domestic correspondents at the Presidential Palace in Zagreb—live]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, some progress seems to have been made at the talks in Vienna. Is your visit to Sarajevo linked with the outcome of the talks?

[Tudjman] I believe that the two delegations will reach an agreement on the implementation of the Washington agreement. My visit to Sarajevo does not depend [Tudjman laughs] on the Vienna talks. It depends on technical reasons. As you know, I am ready and I was ready to go but this depends on UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and other factors.

[Al-Isa] Nada Al-Isa, Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio-Television. Mr. President, Croatian press has carried a statement by Kresimir Zubak [Bosnian Croat leader] in Vienna. I am confused by what Mr. Zubak said: That Mostar will be the most difficult issue as far as borders between cantons are concerned. I am asking you this because so far Mostar was supposed to be under EU administration as a single city.

[Tudjman] I do not know about this statement by Zubak. Of course Mostar should be under EU administration, but it should also be the capital of the Herzegovina canton, i.e., of the grand county of Herzegovina. This is probably being discussed now and I believe that the delegations will reach an agreement.

[Rexepi] Adrijana Rexepi, Deutsche Welle. Mr. President, in an interview for Pristina's ZERI, Josip Manolic, the chairman of the Chamber of Counties, commented on a statement you made three years ago that Kosovo was Serbia's internal problem. Manolic said that this was part of a deal you made with President Milosevic and that since then Albanians in Croatia could not regulate their documents and their status. Can you tell us what all this is really about?

[Tudjman] It is about a basic principle according to which the status of all ethnic groups in certain states should be solved within those states in line with international conventions. Nothing else is involved.

[Unidentified correspondent] [name indistinct] of the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS. Mr. President, the situation near Brcko is very tense. What is your prediction? Is this area really going to be decisive for the war in Bosnia?

[Tudjman] Yes, the situation around Brcko does give cause for genuine concern. But in view of the open involvement by the international community, including the United Nations, I believe that the complications of war [zapetljaji rata] will be avoided. This is, however, not totally certain but I personally expect that if the Serb forces launch their offensive the international community and the United Nations will respond in a more resolute way than has been the case so far.

[Baratez] Mr. President, Zeljko Baratez, GLAS SLAVONIJE: Is Croatia going to do something to stop the further export of oil from Djeletovci [Serb-held oil field in eastern Slavonija] and to prevent the aggressor from destroying the evidence of his crimes in eastern Slavonija? We know that they have been filling up mass graves with soil and taking bones elsewhere. Thank you.

[Tudjman] Croatia will continue to place firmer demands before the international community on the way UN Security Council resolutions should be implemented unless the Serb side shows readiness to adhere to the agreement on normalizing relations, normalizing Croat-Serb relations within Croatia and on normalizing relations between Croatia and Serbia. In other words, if there is no sign of their readiness—and so far we have unfortunately had no such signs—Croatia will understandably take steps at a diplomatic level and elsewhere to ensure that the issues you raised are tackled and that there is a speedy integration into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia of the Croatian areas now under the protection of the peace forces, or rather under Serbian occupation.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, how do you comment on parliamentary events and what will happen at the forthcoming session? Will Mesic and Manolic resign and who will replace them?

[Tudjman] One thing should be clear about the events in parliament. Attempts by those who wanted to create a parliamentary and a constitutional crisis failed. This was the goal of Mesic and Manolic when they formed their new party. The Croatian Democratic Union remains a majority party, with an absolute majority in both chambers of parliament. It can be expected that this so-called parliamentary crisis will be solved in a democratic, parliamentary manner. Croatia is organized as a state with a multiparty parliament, and according to all parliamentary and multiparty principles the chairmen of the chambers [Mesic and Manolic] must be from the ranks of the party that has the majority in parliament. It is normal to expect Mesic and Manolic to accept the democratic principles and that an agreement will be reached through a parliamentary debate between party representatives. This should be solved in a parliamentary, democratic, civilized manner and, of course, if this should not be the case the majority party can make certain changes in line with the Constitution—changes that serve to preserve a democratic, parliamentary system.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, will the kuna [new Croatian currency] be introduced on the occasion of Statehood Day [30 May], and can you tell us more about the name kuna [marten]? Many say that that was the name of the currency used during the NDH

[Neovisna Drzava Hrvatska—Independent State of Croatia during World War II] and stress its' association with the then Fascist regime. Mr. Manolic even said: Why not call it the zec [rabbit] or the lisica [fox]?

[Tudjman, laughing] Well, I honestly have neither read about nor heard that piece of witticism. I know that when we discussed the name of the Croatian currency there were people who were against it. However, following the very serious debate we had in both political and scientific circles we decided to give the name kuna to the Croatian currency. Why? Well, because the animal was used for payments in kind from the 11th century. If I am not mistaken, the name kuna was first mentioned in documents as a means of payment in kind in 1018. It was used throughout Croatia, and not just in Slavonia but right down to the island of Cres. Also, another point: Marten was used as the means of payment in kind in a large part of the world, from Russia to Canada. Marten was not just used for payments in kind but also as a currency. There are documents that indicate that in the 13th century the fur of one marten was equal to 10 dinars. In addition, the majority of European currency names, such as the Latin currency and the English pound, the German mark, and the Italian and French currencies date back to barter trade.

So, by naming our currency after what was used in Croatia as means of payment in kind we are merely following the European tradition in naming national currencies.

Such a statement—that the currency should be called the zec or the lisica—is slightly surprising, and dare I say frightening—coming as it did from people who frequently appear on the political scene, since these names have no historical background while the name kuna has. It is even more surprising that statements against the kuna have come from university professors.

In other words, kuna [the animal] was not just a means of payment in kind but was also depicted on Croatian money during the Croatian-Hungarian union, on its coins. The kuna is on the coat of arms of one of the three Croatian kingdoms, i.e. of the kingdom of Slavonia—there is a kuna on the coat of arms of the kingdom of Slavonia. At some stage in history the kingdom of Slavonia was synonymous with Croatia. Consequently, linking the kuna only with the NDH is not wise at all. On the contrary, it shows petty politics and an attempt to discredit the Croatian democratic authorities.

Speaking about that, we should remember that after its establishment in 1939, the Province of Croatia [Croatian part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia] also wanted to introduce a Croatian currency and planned to call it kuna. Artist Kerbic made prototypes of the currency called kuna or banica, but all this did not happen because the then Croatian political authorities were not sovereign, and there were conflicts about the currency issue.

When we discussed the problem of naming the new Croatian currency we considered all that. We considered the tendency in Europe and Croatia to develop the names of national currencies. We concluded that there was no reason why nowadays, when we have an independent, sovereign, autonomous Croatian state...[pauses] that today we can give the Croatian currency the name that has the greatest tradition in Croatia as a means of payment both in kind and as a currency. The fact that the name was in use during the Second World War in a Quisling regime that functioned within Hitler's new European order—other European countries now also have currencies that they had before, during the Second World War.

When we created the independent sovereign Croatia, we wanted finally to give the right name to the Croatian national currency. All the more so because that name is very easy to pronounce here and abroad and because it is unique. There is no name similar to that. When for a while we considered the name kruna [crown], we concluded that we are not a kingdom—after the loss of the medieval kingdom we had no independent Croatian kingdom—and that there are many currencies called kruna in Europe—Czech, Norwegian, Swedish, and all sorts of krunas in Europe. The kuna will be the unique Croatian currency.

Consequently, all historic and political reasons were in favor of the name kuna. We thus displayed political and national maturity, and the determination to defend our historic traditions and the interests of the sovereignty of the Croatian nation.

Academician Brozovic is preparing a special monograph on that issue—I think it will be published soon. All this will be explained. I believe that we can be happy and proud that we are introducing a new Croatian currency along our true traditions, and also in line with the tradition of naming national currencies in European countries.

[Segoje] Zvonimir Segoje, Hrvatski Vjesnik, Vinkovci and Zadar. When the war ends with Serbia's military defeat, Serbia will have to pay reparations. It is obvious that they [the Serbs] will not be able to pay. Serbia set an example [of getting reparations paid in some other way] when it got the area of Stubica from Bulgaria after the First World War, instead of the reparations. We respect the post-Second-World-War borders, whereby the historic Srijem and Boka Kotorska are outside of Croatia. Will we ask for Srijem, Boka Kotorska, and perhaps a part of Backa instead of the reparations?

[Tudjman] The reparations would certainly be justified for historic and other reasons. But, we also must bear in mind that we are living in a different world today. We are living in a world where the new order that is being created does not accept violent changes of state borders. This world wants to secure, within existing states, national rights for other nations and national minorities. I am afraid that we would not get any support for such demands in the present democratic world, that we could

cause unwanted consequences. But, Croatia will certainly bear in mind the destruction that was done, it will bear in mind its rights and will set some demands before the international community, which we think are justified and for which Croatia could get support from the international community in which we have to live.

[Unidentified correspondent] I presume that you know what is happening at the Vienna talks. It has been reported that some kind of result will be achieved by 1400. Can you confirm this, and is it true that the issue of who will be the president of Bosnia in the first 12 months is an obstacle for the talks?

[Tudjman] I believe that the delegations will find a solution, as I have said. As far as the main issues regarding the setting up of the federation and the confederation [of Bosnia and Croatia], the issue of who will get the top posts, should not be vital. However, what is vital is to immediately start implementing the principles we have agreed upon at the talks we have had so far, including the Washington agreement we signed. This agreement says that the prime minister and the president of the federation cannot belong to the same nation in the same term. Therefore, the Croats are not making any exclusive demands. The Croatian delegation just wants the agreement—the agreement that was reached under the auspices of the United States and the international community, they want the agreement and its implementation to be respected.

I believe—and as far as I know from the reports last night—I believe that the agreement has been reached.

[Heinrich] President Tudjman, I am Mark Heinrich from REUTER. Can you tell us, according to your information, how many deputies from the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] have joined the new party set up by Mesic and Manolic, and do you think that more deputies will change party ranks?

[Tudjman] According to evidence so far, of 85 HDZ deputies in the Chamber of Deputies, seven joined Mesic and Manolic. Therefore, that does not bring into question the absolute majority of the HDZ in the Croatian Parliament. According to parliamentary principles, even the party that has a relative, rather than an absolute majority, has the right to appoint the presidents of the assembly chambers, that is, to have proportional influence in the parliament.

Consequently, precisely because we cannot even speak about a rift in the majority party, but only about the departure of several deputies, I think that the changes caused by this will be dealt with at the next session in a normal, democratic way. As I said before, I expect—and there are indications that an agreement will be reached between the heads of parliamentary delegations in the Assembly, and that this will be carried out in the usual parliamentary fashion. After all, those gentlemen always invoke democracy and democratic principles, so we can expect that they will abide by those principles.

All the more so because we live at a time—you raised the question of a possible war around Brcko, so it is possible that the situation will further deteriorate in that area—when we need a stable constitutional and political system in Croatia. The question inevitably arises as to who would need the destabilization of the democratic Croatia, the destabilization of the Croatia that the world, Europe, the United States, and the international community need as a stable country. Therefore, I expect that in this context this problem will be solved in a normal democratic way.

[Modric] Sanja Modric, Novi List. Mr. President, this year you took part in the 1 May celebrations in the Maksimir park, which was very well received by the people. Do you perhaps intend to take part in the celebration of [the anniversary] 9 May at the Square of the Croatian Great today, organized by several associations of citizens?

[Tudjman] No, I personally will not be there. But, my participation in Maksimir was not a gesture of particular importance, I have been to Maksimir before. That was the Labor Day of all citizens of the world, and also of Croatian citizens. I am, of course, the president of all Croats and all [Croatian] citizens, regardless of their party allegiance. Croatia will continue to function this way in future.

[Correspondent] [name indistinct], HTV [Croatian TV]. I would like to refer back to the Square of the Croatian Great. Recently there has been an increasing number of demands to change the name of the square back to its original name—the Square of the Victims of Fascism. Can you give us your comment on this?

[Tudjman] Well, such demands have also reached me. It is interesting that they were linked with the problem of the kuna, which I have already mentioned. No, the Square of the Croatian Great will not be renamed again to the Square of the Victim of Fascism, because we created the democratic modern Croatia on the reconciliation of the divided Croats. If we had left the Square of the Victims of Fascism we would have had to rename one of the main Zagreb squares the Square of Victims of Communism—because there were no fewer victims of Communism than of Fascism in Croatia.

Let us build our democratic Croatia on the tradition of both anti-Fascism, the Croatian anti-Fascism—for Croatia gave a larger contribution to the anti-Fascist struggle in the Second World War than any other peoples of the former Yugoslavia...[pauses] But Communism also inflicted a large number of victims on Croatia. We were trying to bring together the divided, opposed Croats, and through this reconciliation we created a democratic, modern Croatia—and we will continue with such a policy, and not divide the people with some squares of the victims of Fascism and Communism etc.

I have also personally recommended to the mayor of Zagreb to call Dotrscina—an area where Croatian anti-Fascists were indeed killed—the Square or the Field of the Victims of Fascism.

On the day of our statehood we will inaugurate the monument, or rather the Altar of the Croatian Homeland in Medvedgrad. This will be a location where we will pay our respects to all the victims from our history, regardless of which side they were on when they died for Croatia, Croatian freedom, the Croatian homeland.

[Ramljak] Olga Ramljak, SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. We have often mentioned the Vienna agreement here. We have said nothing about the agreements—which were set in motion and then stalled, stalled quite seriously—between Croatia and representatives of Serbs from the so-called Krajinas. Instead we have witnessed situations in which the Croatian Army has fully complied with the signed agreements and has withdrawn but the refugees have not returned. There is no chance of them returning in the near future. What is the obstacle that stalled these negotiations? To what extent will they be affected by the latest situation in parliament and those negotiators who have been criticized by the public? What is the latest situation? What kind of hope can refugees have in the light of the current situation?

[Tudjman] The latest development is the fact that instead of implementing the agreement on normalization and the Serb side's political promises that it would embark on normalization, it has hardened its' positions to the effect that Krajina is something special and that it will no longer be returning to Croatia. This is a truly new development. We do take this into account. This hardening position has probably emerged in parallel with the hardening positions in Bosnia, that is with the open and escalating questions in Croatia's occupied areas for as long as the Bosnian question remains unsolved. [sentence as heard]

We have made it clear, we are still making it clear, both to the Serbian side and the international community, that we remain committed to the principle of necessary normalization in relations, to the need for and the feasibility of a political solution. We are, however, not going to tolerate delays in resolving the incorporation of the Croatian territories protected by the peace force, i.e. under Serbian occupation. We must start resolving the problem of enabling the refugees to return. If we do not succeed in implementing this agreement on normalization with the Serbian side with the help of the United Nations and the international community, then we will have, on our part, to take every step in order to secure the return of refugees and the incorporation of this area into Croatia. Our public, as well as the Serbian side and the international public must rest assured that we will do so.

As far as this question is concerned we will, of course, bear in mind the question whether those who have negotiated so far have fully carried out their task, whether they are trusted by the public, as you put it. In any case I have already decided that Djordje Pribicevic should take part in the negotiations, i.e. take part in the team. It remains to be seen whether there will be any other problems.

[Ramljak] Is there any chance of people who are real refugees being directly included in the negotiating team? Perhaps, someone who is a member of the refugee community.

[Tudjman] If this were purposeful, we could indeed do so. Let us be realistic, though, in this respect. Someone from the ranks of refugees might represent the interests and views of his own area. One should instead resolve these problems as a whole. It has turned out that it is impossible to have a large number of negotiators because it is impossible to find solutions. Understandably, yes, if this were purposeful, if we found such a justifiable suggestion accepted by me and the Croatian Government.

[Ramljak] Excuse me once again, I would like to ask something in connection with the last question. Mr. Mikelic speaks about a new territorial organization of Krajinas. Mr. Martic says that they will defend the Posavina corridor. Mr. Prijic says that the line of separation is practically a state border. Mikelic says that they have started an economic recovery in Krajina. Will the Croatian side take some concrete steps if the Serbs move from words to deeds?

[Tudjman] I think I answered all your questions a minute ago. Of course, we must take into consideration these irresponsible—not to say anything worse—statements by representatives of the Knin Serbs. We have pointed out to the international community that the problem is in Belgrade, that this is Belgrade's occupation—a Serb, a Yugoslav occupation—of those areas, because they provide them not only with money and documents which state that Knin is part of Serbia, but also with weapons and so on. In that respect, we will take all measures—both through the international community and internally—to bring such behavior to an end.

I repeat, if we fail to achieve a political solution within the framework of the agreement on normalization and clear statements of all international factors—from UN Security Council resolutions to statements by representatives of the world's most important powers from the United States, China, and even Russia which recognize Croatia's territorial integrity—then, naturally, Croatia will have to take different steps. But, of course, then we will have—I hope—the political support of the international public, which is not ready to accept an armed liberation of those areas prior to all political options being exhausted.

[Correspondent] [Name indistinct], VECERNJI LIST. You have said that seven deputies would follow Manolic and Mesic. You have recently said that about 1 percent of the HDZ would leave with them. Do you still think the same?

[Tudjman] Yes, I do. It is obvious that a bit more than 1 percent of deputies have left. I still say that not more than 1 percent of the HDZ members will leave. In turn, a significantly larger number will join the HDZ. This is already happening in all counties, and in the diaspora. We have received hundreds of cables and letters of support for the central HDZ policies and the state policy. These messages say that their [Mesic's, Manolic's] departure will in fact strengthen the HDZ, its central policy adopted at the second HDZ assembly.

Among hundreds and hundreds of letters, only one was against [the central HDZ policies]. You know what it says, what he [the author] finds important! He says: As a HDZ member I also join Manolic and Mesic because I cannot accept the decisions of the second HDZ assembly, because I cannot accept the new name of the Croatian currency, and because I disagree that God Save Croatia should be the HDZ anthem. So these are the reasons then [Tudjman laughs] why this single one among hundreds of letters agrees with Mr. Manolic. I believe that these hundreds of letters reflect the general mood, not among hundreds but among thousands and tens of thousands of HDZ members and among those who are not its members. All this indicates that the HDZ, as the central democratic Croatian party, will continue to gain strength.

[Kuzmanovic] Jasmina Kuzmanovic, AP. Mr. President, last week the United Nations explicitly called—for the first time—on the Bosnian Army to steer clear of the corridor. They called on both the Serbs and the Bosnian Army to steer clear of the Brcko area. It is a fact that the corridor is vital for the Serbs as it links the occupied areas of Bosnia and Croatia to Serbia proper. It is also a fact that there have been difficulties and problems in the talks between Croatia and Serbia and Croatia's Serbs. What is your comment on this move? Does this amount to the creation of some new UNPA [UN protected area] zone in Bosnia?

[Tudjman] I believe that, having experienced all their bitter lessons in seeking a solution to the Bosnian crisis, international factors have drawn the conclusion that neither side should be allowed to spread the war. After all, the Croat-Muslim agreement on cooperation, on the federation and confederation, was reached under international supervision so as to restore peace as soon as possible rather than to prolong the war. Hence, what you have pointed out should be seen from this point of view—the international community will try to prevent the war from spreading. In Bosnia itself there is a threat of complications on a wider international scale.

[Kuzmanovic] As regards the threat of the war spreading—does this in a sense cement their [Serb] gains if they can keep this corridor as a protected zone?

[Tudjman] No, this does not cement the corridor because the international community will not let the Serbs keep all 70 percent, they [Serbs] even say that they hold as much as 73 percent of Bosnian territory. Things have been made clear—agreements are being sought on the basis of the agreements hitherto reached within the Geneva Conference to the effect that the current Bosniak Muslim-Croat federation should get 51 percent and the Serbs 49 percent. Given the agreement on the federation and confederation, not only is this waiting in the wings, but the responsible diplomats taking part in this conference are saying that the Serbs should pay slightly more than this for a solution.

Consequently, by no means will the international community accept such a territorial solution that will correspond with today's real situation.

[Veric] Luka Veric. Mr. President, it is a fact that many Croatian citizens are leaving the country. Many of them are educated young people. A number of ethnic Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina are also leaving the country. What is Croatia doing to stop this? Is there any interest in this? Some people say that we are talking about worrying numbers of people leaving. Thank you.

[Tudjman] We could say that we should worry about it, but I believe that we are not talking about such large numbers. Croats are leaving for foreign countries, and young people as well, as a result of the war evils that we have experienced, the occupation of one quarter of the Croatian territory, and of everything that the war imposed on us.

Even in normal conditions, insufficiently developed countries cannot prevent the so-called brain-drain into the more developed countries of the world. In Croatian conditions, in such war conditions, both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this was an inevitable consequence.

But at the same time young people are coming back to the homeland despite the conditions. I have had a report of some 100 young people returning. With the creation of a democratic Croatia and the economic reforms, with the curbing of inflation—we have already begun the positive process, not only of attracting investment from the diaspora and from foreign countries, but also of having Croatian people return to the homeland. We see such cases on a daily basis.

The democratic Croatian authorities must certainly do their utmost to stimulate this process as much as possible. When the war ends and the problems are resolved, and agreements are reached—like the ones with the United States and the one that the prime minister signed in Iran and with some other countries—through the development of political and economic relations we will create increasingly favorable conditions to stop our people leaving and, on the contrary, to have them return to us.

[Unidentified correspondent] The allocation of socially-owned apartments to high-ranking state officials has caused a lot of negative reaction. What do you think about this?

[Tudjman] Yes, there are well-justified examples of some objections raised as regards this, but there is also a lot of political scheming here, and also—and many people would not be aware of this—a lot of political-psychological warfare against a sovereign Croatia.

What are we talking about here? We are for a transformation from the socialist-type social ownership of apartments into private ownership, so that people have the right to buy apartments. The right to buy has been given to those who had tenancy rights [to live in socially-owned apartments] and to those who could pay [for the apartments] in foreign currency. In that respect all citizens were in the same position. Those who were behind the repressive rule over the Croatian people in the former regime and those who were persecuted by the former regime because of their democratic and national feelings were in the same position regarding this.

If there are some irregularities they should be corrected, equally for everyone. You are probably aware that I personally, on the rare occasion when I chaired a government session—I think in January last year- -chaired a session when the need to fight all forms of crime mercilessly was the particular focus of attention. The need to fight the remains of the communist bureaucratic system and all forms of crime within the new democratic system was discussed.

But I will tell you that there is a certain lack of understanding, and attempts by political schemers to discredit the transformation of the former socialist ownership into private ownership, and attempts to destabilize the authorities in this field.

In upcoming days some people will appear before courts who, between 1990 and the end of 1991, worked in Croatia in an organized and public way against the founding of a democratic Croatia and its survival. One of the main aims of their activities was to compromise the leading people of the new democratic system. This was a part of their organization's program, which had the organizational and program name of Opera.

Such activities have resumed, in one way or another, until today. I can show you on one example how this works in the case of apartments.

When, after 20 years I got a passport for the first time, so that I could travel abroad, I met a young man in Canada in 1987 among the people of various party and non-party allegiances in the Croatian diaspora. I was told he was not interested in politics but was very competent in the field of electronics and communications, and that many companies—from Toronto to Ottawa and Vancouver—were headhunting him. I was told he was the sort of person Croatia needed.

Between 1986 and 1989, that is before the democratic Croatian authorities were established, I used to send invitations to Croatian emigrants, in particular to the young and capable ones, to return to the homeland. Ivica Mudrinic was among them. He is the one I just spoke about. Ivica Mudrinic returned to the country, I do not know how old he (is/was), 35 or 40, with his four children. He made his knowledge, ability, and his patents available to democratic Croatia, his homeland. What did the homeland give him in return? It gave him a tenancy right, the same right enjoyed by those who had made him and his father flee, who had imprisoned me and others. So, can we say that this is an example of crime or dishonesty of the Croatian ministers?

I am for the remorseless elimination of all forms of crime, but I am also for giving a real political and ethic name to each phenomenon [as heard], and for seeing what lies behind some appearances.

I do not know exactly how many tens of thousands of apartments we have already sold, and how many there are left to be sold. This process should be finalized as soon as possible, so that we can implement the denationalization and privatization. We will not allow anyone to prevent us from doing what we want. We have had over one half of the Croatian population living abroad, some people even say that about the same number of able-bodied people have left the country as have stayed in it. There is no democratic Croatia if there is no possibility for these people to return. There are no democratic authorities unless the same rights are given to these people as to those who have stayed in the country. I am not saying that they should have any preferential treatment, but simply the same rights. We should make good use of their experience, both democratic and technical, technological, scientific.

We should stimulate the reconciliation of all citizens of Croatia, in the interest of [preserving] what we have already achieved—an independent, internationally recognized Croatia, which is not only recognized but also needed by the world for the creation of a new democratic order in this part of southeastern Europe. In this light our objective is to have a legal order of the highest level. What we have written into our Constitution and laws—we will be able to fully implement them when the war is really over, when we return 250,000 people—I cannot say to their homes for their homes are destroyed, but to their ruined hearths. When we reintegrate all these areas into the constitutional and legal system of Croatia, and when we can devote ourselves to the economic reconstruction, to the scientific and cultural progress in Croatia...[pauses] We must consistently and fully direct all our resources for Croatia to become a country of freedom and, fully and in every respect, a country of legal order.

This is something that cannot be secured by any country that is drawn into war in one way or another. This is something that is illustrated by the case of the United States during its war with Japan. It [the U.S.] could not apply, it could not comply with the civil rights of Japanese citizens. It had to organize collection centers, camps, and confiscate their property etc. for national security reasons. There are, however, those fools who accuse the Croatian authorities of setting up the camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Croats did not set

them up first because the Croats had to fight there, first against the Serb aggression. They had to survive. Consequently, every phenomenon should be assessed in the light of the exact circumstances in which the democratic Croatia was created, defended, and consolidated.

[Janacek] Janacek, [word indistinct] Mr. President, Mr. Veljko Knezevic, the official representative of the authorities in Belgrade said in an interview to the HRT [Croatian Radio and TV] to our colleague Rajic; he used the term Republic of Serb Krajina as he was talking about Croatia's occupied areas. Can Croatia tolerate the fact that the official representative of a country that has not recognized the statehood of that area—although it itself has not been recognized—can freely voice such statements? Or perhaps, he has permission for such statements?

[Tudjman] I believe that, officially, Croatia cannot tolerate such statements. If this representative—who arrived under the agreement on the normalization of relations, which implies the recognition of Croatia within its borders—were to continue to air such statements, not only in our country, I believe, he would have to stop enjoying our hospitality.

Akashi, Krajina Leaders Agree on Talks Date

LD0905165994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1554 GMT 9 May 94

[Excerpts] Knin, 9 May (TANJUG)—Representatives of the United Nations and the state leadership of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] agreed in Knin today that the talks between Croatia and Krajina resume on 18 May, when economic and humanitarian cooperation will be discussed. The venue has not yet been specified. Geneva and Karadjordjevo were proposed as possible venues today. The UN mediation team was led by Yasushi Akashi. General Bertrand Delapresle, the commander of the peacekeeping forces for the former Yugoslavia, and Kai Eide, deputy cochairman of the Geneva conference on the former Yugoslavia, were also in the UN team.

The RSK delegation consisted of Krajina President Milan Martic; Prime Minister Borisav Mikelic; Foreign Minister Milan Babic; Defense Minister Rade Tanjga, and Interior Minister Ilija Prijic. At a news conference, Akashi described the talks as open, useful, meaningful, and productive. He said three key questions in the peace process had been discussed—the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, the resumption of the RSK-Croatia talks on economic relations, and bilateral issues between the RSK and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]. [passage omitted]

At the end of the news conference, Akashi said that his impression after the talks today was that the state leadership of Krajina was "for cooperation with UNPROFOR in the process of achieving peace and establishing economic relations".

"I am satisfied with the results of the talks today and am optimistic about relations in the future," Akashi said.

President Martic also said the talks had been productive. He praised Akashi as a man fighting for peace and stressed the need to lift the sanctions against Krajina so that the forthcoming talks with Croatia could take place on an equal footing. Martic said he believed that the forthcoming talks between the RSK and UNPROFOR would be fruitful and useful in the resolution of their bilateral relations and obligations.

Commentary Views Serbian Goals in Krajina, Bosnia

AU0905122494 Rijeka NOVI LIST (TJEDNI NOVI LIST Supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 30 Apr 94 p 5

[Commentary by Svetozar Sarkanjac: "The Zagreb Agreement Is Being Tested in Bosanska Posavina"]

[Text] It is not necessary to waste too many words on how the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina are being reflected on the peace process in Croatia. The enthusiasm for peace created after the Washington and the Zagreb Agreements—coordinated by the military and political regimes from Belgrade, Pale, and Knin—were signed, has not only slowed down, but has almost come to a halt. Exactly those negative things have happened that were foreseen by the initiators of this peace process—the U.S. and the Russian representatives.

In spite of certain problems, the first stage of the Zagreb Agreement has materialized in Eastern Croatia since an agreement on the demarcation line in this sector was signed. On behalf of "the two sides" the agreement was signed by Major General Djuro Decak, the commander of the Osijek region, and Major General Dusan Loncar, the commander of the Slavonija-Baranja Corps of the Krajina army. On behalf of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] it was signed by Brigadier General van Dyck, the UN commander of Sector East. The demarcation line, around 410 km long and between several hundred and 2 km wide, was defined in detail by this agreement. This flexible width of the so-called buffer zone was reached after numerous specific requirements of both sides had been fulfilled.

If both sides had insisted on the 2 km width, which was foreseen by the Zagreb Agreement on buffer zones, the demarcation zone would have included parts of many urban areas on both sides. In that case, the Krajinans would have lost parts of the occupied Baranja village of Bilje, parts of Tenja near Osijek, as well as of parts of Mirkovci near Vinkovci. The Croatian side would have lost certain suburban Osijek areas, parts of important roads and manufacturing facilities, and a part of the town of Osijek. In order to avoid such illogical situations, it was decided that the demarcation line be flexible.

Unease About Gorazde

The agreement concluding the first stage of the Zagreb Agreement was signed after a delay of several days since the events around Gorazde, especially the NATO bombardment of the Serbian positions there, upset the Krajina Serbs. Their reaction was—at least in Sector East—relatively tempestuous. A meeting of commissions at the UNPROFOR control point between Nemetin and Sarvas, which had already been agreed upon, was canceled, and, according to unofficial information, the Serbs blocked UN movements throughout the sector that day. Apart from that—according to the first confirmed, but then denied statements by UN soldiers—the Serbs took weapons already put away between Tenja, Mirkovci and Baranja. Since the local UNPROFOR denied the allegations of the Zagreb UNPROFOR, and since the Croatian Army representatives did not openly respond to the reported "exhibition" of Serbian weapons, nothing serious occurred. Even if something had happened, the weapons had already been returned to the warehouses.

This does not mean that something more serious cannot happen. Since the "Krajinan state" is very narrow in eastern Croatia, the Serbs were enabled by the Zagreb Agreement to store heavy weapons in Beli Manastir, Dalj, and Vukovar (something similar was made possible for the Croatian Army in Starigrad, Zadar, and Sibenik). We must not forget that not so long ago similar experiences with storing of weapons behind double locks proved to be extremely negative in this area. UN soldiers are now having the same experience in Sarajevo. What does it mean for security if, for example, a tank at full combat readiness is under a simple lock in a warehouse guarded by several frightened UN soldiers? Nothing! Just as if you had left your suitcase at the railroad station left luggage office for when you needed it. The only difference between checking in a tank and a suitcase is that you have to pay to reclaim it at the railroad station.

Bad Storage of Weapons

The proper storage of heavy weapons under UN control would include a completely different procedure, which has, unfortunately, never been applied in the former Yugoslavia. Fuel and lubricants, for example, have to be drained out of a tank and put into storage. After that, the communications system should be removed and stored in some other place together with ammunition, if possible far from the central warehouse. When the owner of the tank stored in this way wants to take it by force, he needs at least two or three days to get it ready for combat. At the same time, the other side, which should be granted security by this kind of storage, has enough time to see what the enemy is up to. Such an example of heavy weapons storage is nothing new or unknown. On the contrary, this system has already been applied in some earlier UN peacekeeping operations in other crisis areas.

A great many things, which in other crisis areas ended with peace, have not been successful in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore we should be pleased with the agreement reached in eastern Slavonia since even such a situation was inconceivable some time ago. Especially significant is the cooperativeness of the Serbian negotiators, who are ready to grant certain concessions to the Croatian side, although they always expect something in return. Generally speaking, life is easier in eastern Slavonia now.

Commenting on the new situation, Milan Martic, the "president of the republic of Serbian Krajina," told journalists during his visit to Baranja that he wished the peace process to continue, especially those parts of it which concern economic issues. As usual, the Serbian side imposed new conditions. The first was that the negotiations should not be held at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb.

Martic's Blackmail

"Negotiations on the establishment of economic relations with the Croatian side can be held at any Russian embassy in the world, except for those in Croatia and Germany," Martic said, and added another condition. "We can negotiate with Croats only as equal partners, as two equal states. In order to meet this condition, the UN Security Council has to lift the sanctions imposed on the "Krajinans" according to Resolution 820. If normal communications with Hungary and Slovenia are not made possible, we cannot negotiate on the second stage," Martic stated decisively.

It does not matter whether the Krajina leadership is serious or whether they are only dragging out the peace process since the result is, at least for the near future, the same. The events in Bosnia-Herzegovina support them since they have "objective" reasons for stalling for time.

The Key Is Bosanska Posavina

Apart from all this, further negotiations between Croatia and the "Krajinans," especially in this part of Croatia, can be seriously affected by new activities by the Bosnian Serbs in Bosanska Posavina. The aim of the latest military movements of the Bosnian Serbs in this area is perfectly clear: the enlargement of the "life corridor" to a width which will guarantee them free passage between Banja Luka and Belgrade and beyond to Knin. The present corridor is too narrow for the Serbs. It can easily be closed by the coordinated action of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] from the northern part of the corridor (the unoccupied area around Orasje) and of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the southern part (from the direction of Gradacac or Tuzla).

During his recent visit to the occupied Bosanski Samac and Brcko, where the Serbs celebrated the second anniversary of "liberation," General Manojlo Milovanovic openly threatened Croatia with attacks against targets in Croatian territory. Without any scruples he stated that he could bring 20,000 soldiers to Bosanska Posavina to widen the corridor. In other words he warned the Croats against attacking the northern corridor line as long as they are widening the corridor toward the south.

As soon as the Gorazde action is completed, the Bosnian Serbs will have a large number of soldiers at their disposal who can be deployed in Bosanska Posavina. After the massacre in Gorazde it cannot be expected that the Serbs can be scared by international community threats, especially if they remain at the present level.

Corruption in Top Ranks of State Authority

94BA0259A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 19 Apr 94 pp 21-23

[Article by Gordan Nuhanovic: "Messrs. and Comrade Ministers"]

[Text] *When we tried to learn from Minister Mudrinic by fax whether it is true that his ministry bought him an apartment in an elite Zagreb neighborhood for 570,000 German marks [DM] and that he then purchased it for only DM43,000, we received no response.*

Do all the deviations at the top ranks of state power—whether they relate to unconstitutional allotments of apartments to officials, ownership transformation, "managerial loans," smuggling under the auspices of the state, or similar matters—find an alibi in the government's official announcements? Although the demagogic nature of similar government announcements in several former cases was utterly obvious, the government flinched a little after HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Party] deputy Mladen Vilfan repeated his question at the relevant hour in the House of Deputies, whereby he demanded an explanation from Valentic of the controversial 1986 decree on the basis of which around 140 mostly luxurious apartments in Croatia were allocated "for use with the option to buy" to state functionaries, i.e., high-ranking HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] officials. Specifically, Vilfan said that five months ago Valentic only partially answered his question of who received an apartment on the basis of the decree in question, and in what manner, while in response to his related question "how many apartments were distributed through public enterprises and with whose money were they all bought?" the prime minister said that that is a "delicate question that demands serious study of the material and information-gathering" and that he was not yet in a position to provide an answer. HSLS sources talk about 40 apartments that were allocated through public enterprises, and Vilfan considers it unacceptable that the government and Prime Minister Valentic have been avoiding an answer for nearly six months, but that very silence is itself significant enough, Mladen Vilfan believes.

Minister's Silence

At the same time, the silence of Minister Ivica Mudrinic also seems very significant. Checking on the statements made by Mladen Vilfan and Boze Kovacevic in the House of Deputies, when Mudrinic's 203-square-meter apartment in the elite Zagreb neighborhood of Zelengaj was "pilloried," we tried to learn from Minister Mudrinic by fax whether it is true that his ministry bought him that apartment for DM570,000, only for him to then purchase it for only DM43,000. However, we did not receive any response from the ministry in Zagreb's "little cube."

Judging from the "minister's silence" and from the firm guarantees expressed by the HSLS to the effect that they are in possession of all the purchase and sales contracts relevant to Mudrinic's apartment, the reasoning behind the issue is very simple and in fact tragically clear—the state gave the minister of trade and communication nearly half a million German marks.

No one from the cabinet was present at the HSLS interpellation on rescinding the controversial decree on functionary apartments in the House of Deputies.

Although that proposal was rejected, Marijan Prus, as the government's representative and otherwise the head of the Office for Legislation, acknowledged in a certain sense that the decree in question is in conflict with the Croatian Constitution, which does not recognize the institution of "social ownership." Using hackneyed legal terms, Prus tried to explain to the deputies that among the "resources in social ownership that have not been transformed to state ownership there are apartments, so that based on the Law on Housing, apartments can be turned over for use by state officials," noting that the deadline for bringing the law into line with the Constitution is 31 June [as published]. One must not forget that that deadline has already been extended twice thus far, so that Prus's reply prompted uncertainty concerning whether the government can freely violate the Croatian Constitution up to 31 June simply because the law has not yet been fully brought into line with the Constitution.

Unconstitutional Allocation

Despite public attempts by the political leadership to minimize the affair surrounding functionaries' apartments in the sense of "don't make waves," the manner in which apartments are allocated to republican officials is completely transparent and unconstitutional. Specifically, the notion of "tenant housing rights" is in correlation with the notion of "social ownership," and since the 1986 decree on functionary apartments corresponds directly with obsolete tenant housing rights, the unconstitutional positions on the basis of which the government housing commission has allocated 136 apartments to state officials since 1990 are quite clear. Moreover, according to reliable information that the HSLS intends to bring before the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia very soon, all of those apartments were repurchased at extremely low prices, on the average for around 5 percent of the actual market value of such apartments. Vilfan says that in this regard he has concrete data on the apartments of Gojko Susak (237 square meters), Vladimir Seks (65 square meters), and former Minister Babac (151 square meters), while the most curious case is undoubtedly the five-room residential

apartment of Minister Mudrinic. Gojko Susak's apartment on Torbareva Street was completely renovated with money from the Ministry of Defense, and Branko Babac moved into his spacious apartment a month before ceasing to perform his ministerial duties.

Experts have also spoken up about the unconstitutional character of the "allocation of apartments to state officials for use with the option to buy." The editor of the specialist journal INFORMATOR, jurist Ljerka Abramovic, concludes in one of her expert commentaries that the allocation of "all 136 apartments to state officials is a violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which implies criminal accountability, for which the public legal office and state attorney are responsible." The same opinion is held by Dr. Bojana Tomasevic, a professor at the School of Economics and expert on the housing issue. In her opinion, "giving apartments away for use free of charge is a practice adopted from Soviet collective ownership, while here this right has been expanded to privileged leaders and has become unlimited, permanent, and transferrable to all family members. This has made it possible to satisfy the private interests of beneficiaries of tenant housing rights contrary to the interests of all 'receivers' of apartments and of personal funds-revenues with which the social housing fund was created."

Fox Hunt

In the hopes of finding legal "substantiation" to sanction the unconstitutional decree on giving apartments to state functionaries for their use, former state attorney Stjepan Herceg secretly invited experts from the School of Law to a consultation on the issue. However, all of that remained under a veil of mystical silence. We were unable to learn any further details even from the Office for Property Administration of the Republic of Croatia, where we were told by the assistant director of that office, Mr. Martinic, that after the prime minister's response to the liberals in the Assembly "it would be stupid for me to repeat or refute it because I am only a civil servant, but from my perspective the liberal initiative looks like a fox hunt, or rather an attempt to use those apartments for political ends." Regardless of whether this was an expression of awkwardness or, more likely, a lack of more appropriate counterarguments, the liberals are inclined to maintain that members of the Valentic cabinet simply lacked both the professional and the moral justification that would have allowed them to attend the HSLS's latest Assembly interpellation on apartments for state officials.

In accordance with the logic of the voting machinery, the House of Deputies flatly refused to accept a revision of either the communist Law on Housing or the notorious decree on apartments for state functionaries. The Valentic government, which has passed more than 300 laws and decrees during its term, has apparently not found "credible" reasons to intervene in the area of functionary apartments. "And how could they," we were told by one HDZ member who is regarded in the party as a "Manolicist," "when all of them view their political position as a privilege of the privileged and when they are directly interested in seeing to it that the Croatia Constitution is not fully respected." A flat calculation indicates nearly DM30 million that the state has benevolently given to the "lucky recipients" of the 136 apartments in one way or another. Although under the present-day circumstances in which the state finds itself any moralizing about such actions by the state leadership is utterly superfluous, the "political apartments" of Minister Mudrinic, Minister Susak, and Vice President Seks are only the tip of the iceberg of profound and significant hypocrisy, in which the very people who should be most interested in ethical practices by virtue of their position and corresponding reputation are in fact becoming its generators through their actions. What the 50,000 homeless people in Zagreb alone would have to say about this is indeed a rhetorical question.

Rule of the Stronger

Comparing this with the fact that families whose houses were completely destroyed by the war (category 3) have each received DM6,000 is perhaps the best indication of the discriminatory character of allocations of budgetary resources, in the implementation of which all citizens of Croatia are equal participants every day. In the Spanish political system at a time of a pronounced increase in corruption in the mid-1970's, the name "caudillism" took root among the public for this social phenomenon, signifying the criminal coupling of political and economic centers of power, among which the distribution of public property was systematically carried out. This "alliance" quickly broke up due to mutual discord, but the notion of "caudillism" has remained as a real danger in the modern age. A danger that threatens us like Damocles's sword in so-called interim periods when the rule of law gives way to lavish privileges, abuses, and plunder. Although it is not fair to link the situation in Croatia to such extreme deviations, in any emerging legal system, and thus in the Croatian one as well, tolerance of any forms of corruption—beginning with "apartments for functionaries" and including all other forms of societal pathology—means that rule of the stronger is favored over the rule of law.

Minister Mudrinic's reward for his work at the Ministry of Trade and Communication, amounting to half a million German marks, is greater than the annual income of the U.S. President, some people have concluded. Various things from an older Constitution, the U.S. one, have been incorporated into the Croatian Constitution, but apparently it is very hard for one old American rule to penetrate the consciousness of local politicians, namely: If you enter the world of politics with one dollar, you may not take a single cent more than that dollar back out, only one cent less.

Authorities May Deny Visa to Zhirinovskiy

AU1005111794 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 10 May 94

[Unattributed report: "No Entry in Macedonia for Zhirinovskiy"]

[Text] Radio Belgrade reports that the president of the Democratic Association of Serbs in Macedonia, Bora Ristic, has invited the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (presently visiting Belgrade), to visit the Serbs in "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM]." In his interview for Radio Skopje, Ristic said "Zhirinovskiy's behavior is quite interesting, some even say extreme. As he is visiting Yugoslavia at the moment, we invited him as an ordinary citizen, to get directly acquainted with his philosophy and views on the Balkan region. But, I believe chances are he will not be able to come, as the Bolsheviks in Belgrade, and I do not think these Bolsheviks in Macedonia are any better, have deprived him of the right to publicly appear in Belgrade."

Radio Skopje unofficially informs that the Macedonian authorities are not inclined to grant Zhirinovskiy entry and stay in the country. The A1 television finds out Zhirinovskiy had planned to arrive in Macedonia at the Skopje airport. The airport authorities were allegedly ordered not to allow Zhirinovskiy to set foot on Macedonia territory. A1 reports that the air companies have also brought a decision not to allow Zhirinovskiy to board any of their planes flying on international routes.

Police Report on Illegal Border Crossings

AU0905144794 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 9 May 94

[Unattributed report: "1,307 Cases of Illegal Crossings of Border"]

[Text] The Police Department of Debar stated at a press conference that it has registered 1,307 cases of illegal crossings of the Macedonian-Albanian border (1,303 of them being Albanian citizens), in the period of January-April this year. 1,247 of the cases were underage youngsters, who have been returned to Albania by police intervention, whereas criminal charges have been brought against 56 individuals. The police representatives also informed of 11 border incidents near Debar in the same period.

Ministry Denies Italy Seized 'War Vessel'

LD0905154394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1415 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] Ljubljana, May 9 (TANJUG)—Slovenian Internal Affairs Ministry Monday denied reports that an Italian court had ordered the seizure of a ship being built at the Viareggio shipyard for Slovenian police. The ministry said the ship had been paid for, but that its agent—which is in financial difficulties—did not pay the entire amount of over three million German marks to the shipyard. A Slovenian police spokesman said that the Italian court had seized the vessel from the shipyard due to the debt, and that Slovenia would get it when it is finished. The ship is to be the first war vessel of the Slovenian Army. It is believed that this issue could aggravate the already tense relations between Slovenia and Italy, characterized by many disputes such as the issue of the border demarcation between Italy and this former western Yugoslav republic.

There have been growing though as yet unofficial demands in Italy for a revision of borders, with the explanation that the demarcation agreement now in force had been signed with the former Yugoslav Federation and not with Slovenia. An article carried by the IL PICCOLO daily warns that the vessel in question is not a police patrol boat but a real war vessel equipped with seven radars, underwater television cameras, infrared viewing systems and other sophisticated equipment.

Court Insists on Delivery

AU0905200594 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] The boat that the Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs has ordered in Italy is a rescue vessel, not a military vessel. This is what has been asserted by its designer in an official police investigation. Here is a report by Mirjam Muzinic:

[Begin Muzinic recording] While Italian newspapers have swiftly taken up the story on the confiscation of a vessel ordered in Viareggio for the needs of the Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs and paid for in Turin, today agencies devote hardly any attention to the event. What is involved is one of the large number of similar cases that our neighbors are used to, colleague journalists (Luca Daldi) from the Viareggio IL TIRENO told us on the telephone. It is known that the order was made by a middleman from Turin, who received 3.2 billion Italian Lire from Slovenia. The vessel is 20 meters long and a little more than 5 meters wide. It is equipped with radar, satellite navigator, depth gauge, night sights, and computer-operated navigation, something that would indicate that what is involved is a military vessel.

In the official police investigation, the designer, an eminent expert, (Sergio Sardos), born in (Pula), Croatia, and a long-time Italian citizen, denied this. Due to the bankruptcy process, the respective court has excluded the vessel from the estate fund, and ordered that it should be completed as soon as possible and delivered to the purchaser. All that is needed is the payment of the order, which has obviously stopped at the Italian middleman and is in the hands of the court.

According to the IL TIRENO's journalist, a prominent representative of the Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs is expected to visit Viareggio this afternoon, something that the Ministry's spokesman Bozo Truden denied. Slovenia ordered the vessel in Italy when Igor Bavcar held the post of the minister of internal affairs. It should have been taken over in the middle of last September. [end recording]

Federal

Russia's Zhirinovskiy on Plans To Defeat West

LD0905172694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1638 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, 9 May (TANJUG)—The Serb National Renewal Party [SNO] organized a rally in Belgrade's Republic Square. Among others the gathering was addressed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, president of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR]. SNO representatives pointed out that the meeting was organized to mark the 49th anniversary of the victory against fascism and as a harbinger of the upcoming Serbian victory.

Addressing the rally, Zhirinovskiy said that Russia would get a new government and a new president soon. "The day after we will renew all our relations with Yugoslavia and Serbia, sending you all necessary aid, including military aid," Zhirinovskiy said.

According to him, a new holiday will be marked soon—"the day when the last foreign soldier left the Balkans, the day when sanctions against Yugoslavia are suspended." Zhirinovskiy said that if representatives of the Serbian nation ask the Russian Parliament for aid, "hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers would soon arrive in the Balkans."

Expressing his opinion that the conflict in the Balkans could escalate, Zhirinovskiy said that "If NATO and the Muslim world begin a third world war" the Slavs would celebrate 9 May in the future "in all Western cities," while all capitals of NATO members "would be dealt with in the same way as with Berlin in 1945."

He pointed out that the Russians do not have to fight. "We will just let our defective nuclear submarines sail toward the West and that will be the end of Western Europe," Zhirinovskiy said.

Ends Belgrade Visit

LD1005114694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1103 GMT 10 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, May 10 (TANJUG)—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, president of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, who was in Belgrade since Sunday, left the Yugoslav capital on Tuesday morning.

The Serbian National Renewal (SNO), a non-parliamentary party which orgnaized the visit, said that the Russian delegation had left for Moscow, via Budapest, to attend a session of the Russian parliament's lower house (Duma) on Wednseday. On Monday Zhirinovskiy addressed a rally marking Victory Day in the centre of Belgrade.

Romania To Strengthen Ties After Sanctions

LD0905180294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1711 GMT 9 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, May 9 (TANJUG)—Romanian delegation chief Theodore Mircea said Monday in Belgrade that his government had already drawn up agreements on the strengthening of economic cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) once the U.N. sanctions are lifted.

These agreements are aimed at putting right the present injustice and giving to the F.R.Y. the status of principal Romania's economic partner, Mircea told Serbian Government Minister Dragan Tomic during their meeting, Serbian Information Ministry has announced.

Even in the present situation, Romania has strived through allowed activities to maintain cooperation with Yugoslavia. During one year, it addressed to the sanctiors committee one thousand requests for humanitarian exports to the F.R.Y., but only 334 of these requests worth 456 million dollars were granted. The Romanian Government believes that authorizations for humanitarian exports to the F.R.Y. should from now on be granted more speedily and frequently, and will persevere in its requests to this end, the ministry communique says.

Tomic said that his talks with the Romanian delegation, which comprises government repgesentatives, businessmen and experts in economic development, were paving the way for a more fruitful economic cooperation in all fields in the joint interest, as soon as sanctions are lifted. The cooperation continues even in conditions of international embargo, which is causing great losses to Yugoslav and Romanian economies, he added.

The U.N. Security Council imposed the sanctions on Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) on May 31, 1992 because of Yugoslavia's alleged military involvement in the civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The arrival of the Romanian delegation for a several-day visit to Serbia was agreed at the highest state level during Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's visit to Romania last month. During that visit, the two sides had expressed interest in market transformation, privatization and economic integration in the Balkans, especially as the united Europe is now finalizing its own integration process, the communique said.

Serbia

Arkan Threatens Albanians, U.S. Soldiers

AU1005110094 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 5 May 94 p 3

[Deutsche Welle-attributed report: "Chetnik Leader Arkan Demands the Deportation of 700,000 Albanians From Kosovo to Albania"]

[Text] Although it is true that the message of Serbian Patriarch Pavel II to believers and the president called for an end to the war and for a Christian peace, the longing for peace in Serbia shines side by side with the ever-waning NATO threat of action if there is no immediate withdrawal from Gorazde. According to a recent poll, 40 percent of the people want the occupied territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be retained, whereas 60 percent favor unification with other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Similar answers were also given with regard to the consequences of the [UN] sanctions. Of those polled, 20 percent think that the sanctions against the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia [as published] could remain in force for another couple of months, while 40 percent argue that the sanctions should be lifted because the country is facing starvation. Any belief that the superdinar might work wonders has dwindled into insignificance. The Easter liturgy, which was broadcast on all the radio and television stations of former Yugoslavia, was conducted by Patriarch Pavel II in the monastery of Peja in Kosova. The Serbian militants see this liturgy as representing their rightful claim to part to Kosova and Metohija—the heartland of the medieval Serbian empire.

The chetnik leader Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, an individual who is wanted by Interpol as a war criminal and whose Party of Serbian Unity suffered a fiasco in the last elections, last Friday [29 April] in Prishtina, in the presence of his idolaters, demanded the deportation of 700,000 [Kosovar] Albanians to Albania. Arkan threatened to amputate the legs of the U.S. soldiers stationed in the neighboring republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] if they dared to cross the border with Kosova. At the same time he publicly made numerous territorial claims on Macedonia.

On the eve of the Orthodox Easter, the army of the former Yugoslavia ended its large-scale military maneuvers in Kosova and Sandzak, which, according to the chief of the [Yugoslav Army's] General Staff, showed that the Yugoslav Army fears no enemy whatsoever.

Radicals Protest Abolition of Chetnik Movement

AU0905192294 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 May 94 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Fear of Responsibility 'Abolishes' the Chetniks"]

[Text] "An attempt has been executed to assassinate an organization that served as a basis for the founding of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] and later became the backbone of the party, from which the self-abolished chetnik duke rose to the very top of Serbian policy," reads the statement of the SRS branches for Montenegro and Serbia, issued in reaction to [Vojislav] Seselj's Radicals' decision to abolish and disband the Serbian chetnik movement.

Dr. Seselj, acting according to the "abracadabra" principle, is attempting yet another double political somersault aimed at achieving a change in the course of events on the Serbian political scene and baffling the public. However, he will not succeed. Actually, he cannot succeed, because the Serbian people have passed the test of political maturity. These people no longer accept the reheated lies and deceptions packaged in a national wrapping [sentence as published].

At a moment when the recent chetnik duke, who has never smelled gunpowder, is losing his reputation and trust among the Serbian people and the Serbian Radicals, it seems that he has also lost his patience.

It seems that he wishes to forget that a great many of these patriots and volunteers were sent to the front without any military training, and that they were led by officers that he [Seselj] appointed, who did not have the necessary military knowledge or experience, which resulted in a great number of deaths and injuries.

Due to fear of responsibility, the chetnik duke is erasing the chetniks from his political life. He probably thinks that by erasing files, he can also erase human memory.

The duke has forgotten that he just recently appointed 20 chetnik dukes. With these appointments, considering some of the people from the ranks of the new dukes, Seselj has publicly made a laughing stock of the highest chivalrous and spiritual attainment that the Serbs have reserved for their historical dukes.

If Mr. Seselj is not ashamed of his actions before the domestic and foreign public and the thousands of members of the chetnik movement, he should be ashamed before the dead Serbian patriots, disabled veterans, war orphans, and the Serbian mothers and sisters shrouded in black.

The Serbian Radicals from Montenegro and the Serbian Radicals, even though they believe that political parties do not have the right to claim the chetnik movement, will never renounce this national and patriotic organization of the Serbian people, ends the statement of the two parties signed by Radovan Bukcevic and Zvezdan Babovic.

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